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9.1.  Introduction 
From the Inca empire to the viceroyalty and then to the Republic, Peru has 
enjoyed both international prominence and open opportunities for economic 
development. The “guano era” in the nineteenth century gave Peru consider- 
able surpluses, as did mining, fishing, and petroleum in more recent times. 
Yet, despite its generous resource endowment, Peru has failed to find its way 
to a stable political,  social, and economic environment in which to prompt 
balanced growth and equitable development. Economic decline has been par- 
ticularly notorious over the last three decades, when Peru’s income per capita 
fell from the eighth highest in Latin America in the 1960s, to the fourteenth 
position in the late  1980s.’ At  the turn of  the decade, Peru’s economic ret- 
rogression can be gauged by  an income per capita equal to that of  1960 and 
by  a level of  exports 40 percent lower than that of  1979. Peru’s frustrated 
economic and social expectations were eloquently described by  its leading 
historian, Jorge Basadre, who defined Peru as a “beautiful promise yet to be 
fulfilled.” 
The object of  this paper is to analyze the economic process undergone by 
Peru  during the period  1985-90  during which the legendary APRA  party 
(American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) assumed presidential office, for 
the first time, under President Alan Garcia. Following closely the methodol- 
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ogy recently developed by Dornbusch and Edwards (1990), the paper is orga- 
nized as follows. 
The next section provides a brief background on Peru’s economy and recent 
history. The third section analyzes the “heterodox” economic policies of the 
period  1985-90  an their results. The section opens with a description of the 
macroeconomic legacy-of  high inflation and low income, but also of com- 
petitive exchange rate, high public tariffs, and sizable international reserves- 
left by  the second administration of Fernando Belaunde.  This legacy repre- 
sents  the  initial  conditions  of  the  period  under  examination.  The section 
continues with a discussion of the analytical framework underlying the mac- 
roeconomic  program  launched  in August  1985. The focus then  shifts to an 
analysis of the expansionary  phase of  the heterodox experiment ( 1985-87), 
starting with a description of the economic measures-of  demand expansion, 
price freeze, and unilateral default-contained  in the  1985 policy package, 
and following with an examination of the dynamics of the consumption boom, 
in which GDP expanded  by  a cumulative  16 percent  and  inflation  initially 
declined but at the expense of mounting financial and external disequilibria. 
This main section closes with a detailed analysis of the recessionary phase 
(1988-90)  during which,  after  three  unsuccessful  corrective  attempts,  the 
economy lapsed into an incipient hyperinflation and a major recession and real 
wage  decline.  Particular  attention  is  given  to the  period  September  1988 
through June  1989 in which the Central Bank took an independent course of 
credit restraint, whereby it managed to partially hold back the hyperinflation- 
ary course and to accumulate a considerable level of  international reserves. 
This trend, however,  was later reversed  in  1989 when economic policy  en- 
gaged again in another round of expansionary policies in an attempt to reacti- 
vate economic activity through depletion of international reserves. 
The fourth section sums up some of the devastating effects of the experi- 
ment on  income  distribution,  other welfare indicators,  resource  allocation, 
rural incomes, the tax system, public infrastructure, and the financial viability 
of the public sector. 
Finally, the fifth and last section contains a few thoughts and concluding 
remarks on demand-led experiments in the light of Peru’s recent experience. 
The main ones are the following. First, the phases of the Peruvian process of 
1985-90  match closely those of  the paradigm established by Dornbusch and 
Edwards (1990).  Second, the idea of finding strategies for rapid reactivation 
of severely depressed economies-typically  coming out of a previous stabili- 
zation phase-has  indeed long appealed to politicians and economists alike. 
However, the recent Peruvian  experience proves,  as many others have, that 
this  type  of  policy  course almost  inevitably  implies disregard  for the con- 
straints imposed  by  flow of  funds accounting  and  thus  leads to macroeco- 
nomic failure.  On the other hand, the policies utilized to prompt the recov- 
ery-comprising  typically  a broad array of  subsidies,  controls, and  import 
restrictions-are  diametrically  at  variance  with  the  incentive  structure  re- 265  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
quired to move the economy into the desired follow-up phase of  investment 
and  export growth. Therefore, demand-led  macroeconomic  booms have  an 
inevitable and devastating aftermath of high inflation and decline.  Third, of 
the  different  theories  that  attempt  to  explain  why  politicians  launch  self- 
defeating policies, Peru’s recent experience provides some evidence support- 
ing the  hypotheses  of  high  discount  rate  and  faulty  economic  framework. 
However, these explanations are partial and somewhat naive and therefore, a 
more thorough consideration of political agents and factors is probably called 
for.  Finally,  Peru’s  very unequal  income  distribution  and acutely diverging 
interests  between  urban  and rural  groups, on the one hand, and labor and 
capital, on the other, makes it particularly prone to unstable stop-and-go eco- 
nomic policy cycles. 
9.2  Background and Recent History 
Efforts to forge physical, economic, linguistic,  and cultural links between 
Peru’s three distinct regions-the  highlands (sierra), the rain-forest (sefvu), 
and the coast-have  long confronted the formidable natural barrier of the An- 
dean mountains.  About half of  Peru’s population of about 22 million live in 
the coastal region, while 40 percent live in the Andean highlands and the rest 
in the Amazon region. Income per capita, which has declined steadily since 
the mid-1970s,  is now about $1,000 (in U.S. dollars). Income distribution is 
one of the most uneven in Latin America, and other welfare indicators, such 
as life expectancy and infant mortality, are among the worst in the region (see 
table 9.1). More than half  of Peru’s poorest 30 percent  live in the Andean 
highlands and are self-employed peasants.  Agriculture and mining have long 
lost their predominance in the economy due to the import substitution model 
Table 9.1  income Distribution (% of Total Income) 
Percentile 
1985-86 
1972  (Household 
1961  (Household  Consumption 
(Earners)  Consumption)  per Capita) 
Poorest 
20% 
2 1 %40% 
4 1 %40% 
6 1 %-SO% 
8  1  %-90% 



















Source:  Data for  1961: Webb (1975); for  1972: Amat  y Leon  (1979); for  1985-86:  Glewwe 
(1987), based on data from Peru’s 1985-86  “Living Standard Measurement Survey,’’ The World 
Bank. 
Note: Figures are not comparable across years due to different methods 266  Ricardo Lago 
followed since the sixties that gradually made manufacturing the mainstay of 
the economy. 
Peru’s modern history has been marked by political and economic instabil- 
ity.  Single-term democratically elected governments have usually been  fol- 
lowed by  periods of  military juntas and vice versa, in an almost alternating 
sequence. In turn, recurrent expansionary macroeconomic policies have ulti- 
mately run into foreign exchange crises and subsequent stabilization episodes. 
The Peru of the 1950s has been characterized as a laissez-faire economy. The 
country was open to foreign trade; exports of raw minerals, mostly exploited 
by  foreign interests, and fish meal paid for imported manufactures. In turn, 
the government had little direct participation in the economy, and economic 
activities were largely unregulated. Industrialization by  import substitution 
and government spending in the infrastructure started with the first govern- 
ment of Fernando Belaunde (1963-68).  A long-pursued tax reform needed to 
restore macroeconomic stability was systematically opposed by an uncooper- 
ative Congress, and Belaunde’s first term ended with an economic crisis and a 
military coup. 
During the nationalistic rule of General Velasco Alvarado (1968-75),  the 
government embarked on an inward-looking growth strategy, established a 
broad array of  controls on economic activity, nationalized foreign corpora- 
tions-particularly  in mining and hydrocarbons-gave  workers participation 
in ownership and management of private firms, and undertook a global agrar- 
ian reform. Large-scale public investment projects and a rapidly growing state 
enterprise sector brought about a mounting foreign debt. 
Favorable external conditions during 1970-74  allowed rapid expansion of 
employment and incomes. In fact, income per capita had grown steadily, at an 
average annual rate of about 2.7 percent, during the entire 1950-74 period, 
with  the exception of  the years  1968-69.  In  parallel,  inflation during that 
period had been moderate but growing. It rose from an annual average of  7 
percent in the 1950s to the teens in the 1960s and early 1970s (table 9.2). 
Starting in  1974, a deep downswing in the terms of trade together with a 
sudden withdrawal of foreign financing sources, in the wake of overly expan- 
sionary public spending, set the ground for a long recession. In that process, 
General Velasco Alvarado was forced out of office in 1975 by an internal coup 
that put his prime minister, General Morales Bermudez, into the presidency. 
Income per capita stagnated in  1974-76  and then dropped, for two consecu- 
tive years,  1976-78,  by  a cumulative 5 percent, while inflation accelerated 
from single-digit rates early in the decade to nearly 70 percent in 1978. 
A strong stabilization attempt was initiated in 1978-79,  with the help of 
favorable terms of  trade.  In  1979, confident that economic growth had re- 
sumed and international reserves had been restored, the government initiated 
an import liberalization program. In that year, general elections were held and 
Fernando Belatinde was voted  back  into the presidency. Belaunde enjoyed 
massive international support but inherited a country with formidable social 267  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
Table 9.2  Public-Sector Finances and Overall Economic Performance 
Annual  Total 
Inflation  of GDP  Debt 
Public Sector (% of  GDP)  Annual  Rate  External 
Gross  Rate  Growth  (in Millions of 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank, National Statistical Institute; Paredes and Pasco-Font (1987). 
dResults  from adding central government expenditures (excluding transfers to state enterprises) 
and state enterprises’ gross expenditures. 
hEnd  of period, includes imputed interest on arrears. 
‘Includes Central Bank financial and foreign exchange losses, as well as transfers to development 
banks. 
problems,  an  income per capita below  its  1974 level, and  major economic 
distortions.  However, during its first three years, his government engaged in 
expansionary  fiscal and monetary policies,  which caused inflation to double 
to  100-plus percent  in  1983. Subsequently,  the  foreign trade  liberalization 
process was reversed. Likewise, the parceling out of land plots that had been 
granted to cooperatives by the military rulers was effected in a less than or- 
derly fashion. In  1983, after frustrated negotiations on foreign debt resched- 
uling and fresh financing with commercial creditors, the government switched 
into a policy of “undeclared’ arrears. As explained below, efforts to stabilize 
the economy were made in 1984-85. 
9.2.1  Brief History of the Traditional Economic Program of the APRA 
Carol Graham (1990) argues that Peru’s age-old paradox is “an extremely 
poor record of  social reform in spite of  the long-term presence of  a strong 
reformist party.” The APRA is one of the oldest mass-based reform-oriented 
parties in Latin America. Originally inspired by the Mexican Revolution, the 
APRA experienced  a significant transformation both ideologically  and tacti- 
cally from a radical and revolutionary party in the 1930s and 1940s to become 
a  more  compromising  and  pragmatic  party  in  the  1950s and  1960s.  The 268  Ricardo Lago 
APRA’s history and ideology are intertwined with the life of its founder and 
main exponent, Victor RaGl Haya de la Torre, who died in 1979. 
Throughout its history, the three central tenets of  the APRA  have been: 
establishment of an anti-imperialist state; creation of a multiclass coalition of 
the oppressed (Frente Unico de las Clases Explotadas); and pursuit of  the 
unification of Latin America. The APRA’s economic strategy has traditionally 
swung from the sometimes radical and occasionally socializing proposals of 
the Programa  maximo to the more  moderate Programa  minimo. The Pro- 
grarna maximo included the nationalization of some resource-based industries 
in the hands of foreign firms; agrarian reform, whereby large latifundia would 
be expropriated and given to peasant cooperatives; and the creation of a sector 
of state-owned firms and worker-owned cooperatives. But at the same time it 
also recognized the need for private property.Z  By contrast, the Programa rnin- 
irno, approved by  the first party congress in  1931 as the platform for that 
year’s general elections, attempted to rule out any socializing fear by empha- 
sizing respect for private property and recognizing the need for properly reg- 
ulated foreign capital. 
The APRA’s most original proposal is the creation of the “Democratic State 
of the Four Powers”: executive, judiciary, legislative, and economic. The eco- 
nomic or “fourth power” would be exercised by  a National Economic Con- 
gress made up of representatives of the state, labor, and capital as a device to 
conciliate the interests of the different classes (planijcacion  concertada).  The 
National Economic Congress would be a colegislative chamber and the su- 
preme authority for economic policy planning and design. 
The Programa minimo of  193  1 established that the intervention of the state 
in economic activity would consist of3 
control over production conditions, prices, and firms’ profits; 
repression of speculative maneuvers of monopolies and oligopolies; 
surveillance of industrial and economic activities; 
reform of banking legislation; 
adjustments to private and public utility tariffs; 
regulation of rents; 
guarantees of “fair” wages and employment conditions. 
The APRA suffered persecution at different times in the 1930s, early 1940s, 
and again in the first half of the 1950s. After the general elections of  1962, 
the possibility that the APRA could assume the presidential office was ruled 
out by a preemptive military coup (Tamayo Herrera 1986, p. 356). The APRA 
assumed presidential office for the first time in July  1985, after its candidate 
for president, Alan Garcia, obtained 48 percent of the popular vote in the first 
round of the presidential elections that had taken place in April of that year. 
2. V.  R. Haya de la Torre, Obrus Cornpleras, vol. 4, pp. 110, 156, 169, 171, 192, 193; vol. 5, 
3. V.  R. Hayade IaTorre (n. 2 above, vol. 5,  pp. 11-29; in Vasquez Bazan 1987, p. 45). 
pp. 17, 18, 19,34,73  (as cited by Vasquez Bazan 1987, pp. 37-47). 269  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
The runner-up candidate, Alfonso Barrantes of the United Left, who had ob- 
tained 24 percent of  the vote  in the first round, declined to contend in the 
runoff  election in view of the popularity ratings of Alan Garcia. In the legis- 
lative elections the APRA also obtained absolute majority in both chambers 
of Congress. 
9.3  The Heterodox Experiment 
9.3.1  The State of the Country Inherited in  1985: The Initial Conditions 
At  the time Alan  Garcia was  sworn in as president in  July  1985, Peru’s 
income per capita was comparable to what it had been in the late sixties, more 
than half of  the labor force was registered by official statistics as not properly 
empl~yed,~  and inflation was nearing 200 percent in the 12-month period end- 
ing in August 1985. Although the official tenet of the second Belaunde admin- 
istration (1980-85)  had  been  orthodox public finance and free markets,  it 
undertook, during its first three years, ambitious infrastructural investments 
that required inflationary financing. Macroeconomic imbalances were com- 
pounded by  the international recession, the drying up of  voluntary external 
financing due to the onset of  the debt crisis in  1982, and a severe natural 
disaster in 1983, when El Nino caused floods in the north and droughts in the 
south. These factors materialized in a 13 percent decline in GDP per capita in 
Against this economic background, the sociopolitical situation had quickly 
deteriorated with continuous labor strikes and frequent attacks by Peru’s two 
terrorist movements (the sierra-based and Maoist Sendero Luminoso, a Shin- 
ing Path, and the urban, Cuban-style guerrilla group, MRTA). A further com- 
plication was constituted by  the flourishing of  drug cropping in the Upper 
Huallaga Valley  where cocaine growers and Sendero had reached a morbid 
symbiosis. Sendero provides cocaine growers with protection against the gov- 
ernment and, in return, the growers provide Sendero with a tax base. Export 
revenues from drug exports have been conservatively estimated at $1 billion 
per year or about 4 percent of GDP (Abusada 1987). 
In its last two years (1984-85),  the Belaunde administration engaged in a 
serious effort to stabilize the economy. Public-sector prices were raised signif- 
icantly and an aggressive exchange rate policy was pursued. The Central Bank 
took an independent stance from the executive and forced the latter to effect 
expenditure cuts and seek genuine sources of revenues. This policy course left 
a good legacy for the incoming APRA government in terms of a competitive 
1983-85. 
4. Official statistics estimated unemployment at 12 percent and “underemployment” at 54 per- 
cent of  the labor force. Of  course, underemployment  is an imprecise,  arbitrary concept. The 
Peruvian Ministry of Labor classifies workers as underemployed if  their incomes are lower than 
the minimum real wage of 1967 or if they are working part-time involuntarily. 270  Ricardo Lago 
exchange rate,  high public-sector  prices,  and relatively  strong international 
reserve position. 
These initial conditions, which characterize the end of a recessionary phase 
in Latin America’s chronic stop-and-go economic policy cycles, provided one 
of the basic premises, as stated in Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) and Sachs 
(1989), for a short-lived consumption-led boom. The other basic premise is, 
of course, a poverty-stricken country with unsettled and mounting social and 
political conflicts, of which Peru is a good example. An additional ingredient 
for a populist course was suitably offered by the preexistence of an incipient 
and  undeclared  policy  of  external  arrears, which  had  been  initiated  by  the 
Belaunde administration in late 1983. At the time of the changeover of admin- 
istrations,  external arrears on Peru’s then-$14 billion  debt had surpassed $2 
billion. The preexistence of de facto arrears also provided a convenient depar- 
ture point for a policy of confrontation with Peru’s creditors. 
9.3.2  Theoretical Underpinnings: Does Demand Create Its Own Supply? 
A problem confronting the APRA party since the Velasco years had been 
that many of the reforms implemented unsuccessfully by the latter in the late 
1960s and early  1970s-such  as the nationalization of  foreign firms, worker 
participation in firm ownership and management,  and agrarian reform-had 
preempted many key issues of  the APRA’s traditional reform agenda. More- 
over,  the rhetoric of  Alan Garcia in the electoral campaign had been  suffi- 
ciently conciliatory to gain support from business and the middle class, a key 
element emphasized by Drake (1982) in his characterization of populism. The 
nationalization of private banks-which  accounted for about half of total de- 
posits, but only one-third of credit-had  been ruled out by the then-presiden- 
tial candidate in his book El Futuro Diferente. 
On the other hand, many influential advisers shared the view that the neo- 
liberal  agenda  had  been  repeatedly  tested,  in  Peru  and elsewhere  in Latin 
America, with an overwhelming evidence of failure. This was a basic claim 
of the book El Peru Heterodox0 (Carbonetto et al. 1987), written by the archi- 
tects of the “heterodox program” launched in August  1985. As a result, the 
absence of an agenda for structural reforms, coupled with the distrust on the 
functioning of markets, resulted almost inevitably  in a policy of intervention 
and widespread,  haphazard subsidies. The following two excerpts summarize 
these views: 
When we took over, orthodox economists wanted us to tell semi-paralyzed 
companies they ought to be saving! Existing theories are no good. One 
difference between us and them is that we believe  in controls rather than 
“opening up” to a historically unequal world market. Our approach is also 
more micro-economic . 
5. Interviews with D. Carbonetto (Peru Reporting EIRL 1987a, p. 1 I) 271  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
It’s a response to the failure of traditional models. It draws on attempts in 
South  America,  the  USA  and  England  during  the  1970s to rethink  the 
workings of the capitalist system under conditions of oligopoly and hetero- 
geneous  development.  . . . In heterogeneous  economies, the  way  prices 
are formed varies  tremendously  according to particular markets.  All this 
conduces to a different vision of how to control inflation.  . . . Another the- 
sis we have abandoned  is the appropriateness of the exchange rate as the 
main, generalized and almost automatic instrument to regulate the foreign 
sector. We have gone in for planned, selective, differential exchange rates.6 
Several macroeconomic  beliefs were broadly held by  the economic team. 
One was that demand management policies were both recession inducing and 
ineffective in dealing with  inflation.  The widespread existence of excess in- 
dustrial capacity was interpreted as indicating that excess demand was not a 
problem.  Aggregate  demand expansion  would  only  cause  inflation beyond 
full employment of both  labor and capital. In other words, aggregate supply 
was thought to follow a reversed L-shaped curve against the price level. Fur- 
ther,  a reactivation of aggregate  demand  would  lead to higher firm activity 
levels and thus to lower per-unit-of-output costs, thereby contributing to defla- 
tion rather than inflation.  Hence, it was argued that periods of expansion of 
aggregate demand are associated with low inflation and vice versa. No distinc- 
tion  was drawn  between  real  and  nominal  aggregate demand. Thus, it was 
noted that: 
It is necessary to spend, even at the cost of a fiscal deficit, because, if  the 
deficit is the result of transferring public resources to consumption of  the 
poor  so as they  can demand more products and firms are able to reduce 
unitary costs, this deficit will not create inflationary pressures,  but all the 
contrary.  . . . This constitutes our major departure with respect to the pre- 
vious strategy of demand restraint. (Carbonetto et al. 1987, p. 82) 
Inflation  was  viewed  as being  exclusively  a  “cost-push’’ phenomenon. 
Hence, setting or, more generally, managing adequately the key prices-ex- 
change rate, interest rates,  and public-sector prices and tariffs-in  combina- 
tion  with  controls on private-sector  prices,  would  provide  a solid cure for 
inflation.  Initially,  a price freeze would  brake  inflationary  expectations  and 
dynamics. Another belief  was that domestic consumption patterns  were un- 
duly dependent  on imported  goods. Therefore, import restrictions were re- 
quired  to change consumption  patterns  into local  goods so as to  reactivate 
internal activity and improve the balance of payments.  Furthermore,  scarce 
foreign exchange could not be wasted in sumptuary imports. Beyond import 
restrictions, a policy of “relative prices,” so as to make goods with high direct 
or indirect import content more expensive, was suggested as a tool to change 
6. D. Carbonetto (Peru Reporting EIRL 1987b, p. 24) 272  Ricardo Lago 
consumption patterns and ease pressure on the balance of payments (Instituto 
Nacional de Planificacion 1986, pp. 75-86). 
In sum, the macroeconomic model the team had in mind was a static one in 
which a “Keynesian cross” determines the level of  output and a “mark-up” 
equation determines the price level-very  much in the tradition of the first 
Wharton models seasoned with import-substitution thinking. The economet- 
ric macromodel utilized for policy-making along with the aforementioned be- 
liefs are fully documented in the book El Peru Heterodox0 (Carbonetto et al. 
1987). 
The effectiveness of  multiple exchange rates for exports, among other in- 
centives, as a device for export promotion was a long-standing claim of some 
Peruvian heterodox economists.’ According to this theory, export commodi- 
ties with higher supply elasticities should be given higher exchange rates- 
and other stimuli-in  order to maximize export levels. Thus, manufacturing 
exports were to be granted a more competitive exchange rate than minerals 
and other traditional exports. This rationale led at some point in  1986 to at- 
tempts to establish contract programs with each major export firm. Under 
these programs the firm would commit itself to a certain export target and in 
return the Central Bank would grant the firm its own tailored real exchange 
rate (in terms of the firm’s own cost formula). The essence of multiple ex- 
change rates as a policy tool can be captured in the following paragraph: 
Multiple exchange rates are a kind of laser beam, allowing for greater flex- 
ibility. As a whole, though, we are aiming at a balance between the degree 
of  devaluation created by  the whole set of  devaluatory instruments at our 
disposal and increases in exporters’ costs. We  are out to ensure exporter’s 
profitability. At the moment, the incentives are concentrated in a few lines 
that we know are especially beneficial for Peru, like garments and fish for 
human consumption. Others are being studied by  the Institute of  Foreign 
Trade. 
Rules-versus-discretion debaters would find a good test case study in the 
economic policy of the period  1985-90.  Indeed, most “prices” were subject 
to some sort of administrative regulation. Adjustments by decree in the struc- 
ture of exchange rates, controlled prices, wages, interest rates, import tariffs, 
and so on, became a daily event. Over the period 1985-89,  there were  186 
decrees (about one per week) modifying the rules and structure of  the ex- 
change rates (Banco Central  1986-90).  This continuous maneuvering with 
policy instruments stemmed from a wholehearted belief in jne-tuning as a 
means of allocating resources better than the market, promoting specific sec- 
7. The debate  on export promotion instruments acquired particular resonance in  Peru since 
1983 when the Association of  Peruvian Exporters issued a report on export promotion prepared 
by Schydlowsky, Hunt, and Mezzera (1983). This report argued, along “second-best’’  lines, that 
export promotion incentives should be used to compensate for distortions so as to conciliate pri- 
vate and social costs. 
8. Interview with D. Carbonetto (Peru Reporting EIRL 1987a, p. 11). 273  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
tors,  benefiting  the  poor,  and  as a  vehicle  for negotiations  with  business 
groups (the so-called concertucion)  . The essence of concertucion was defined 
as follows: 
[This process enables parties] to agree on how much to produce, export or 
import and at what prices (including agreements on input prices), and under 
what conditions the State would provide the necessary approval (in the case 
of social returns not very low and high private returns), support (in the case 
in which social and private returns are high), or subsidy (in the case of high 
social returns and low private returns). The support and/or subsidy can be 
effected through preferential credit, tax and/or tariff exemptions, guarantees 
of provision of foreign exchange, outright subsidies, profit guarantees, etc. 
The  agreements  on  investments  should  include  amounts, location,  and 
terms as well as the conditions for approval, support and or subsidy by the 
State. (Ferrari 1986, p. 522) 
The unilateral default on the foreign debt is undoubtedly  the best-known 
policy  of  President Alan Garcia. The 10-percent-of-exports ceiling on debt 
service payments  was announced  by  the president  at his inauguration.  The 
belief that debt servicing was putting undue pressure on Peru’s meager savings 
capacity was, at the time, shared by business and parties of the left and right 
alike. The net resource transfer had been negative since 1984  and was unlikely 
to become positive any time soon. 
9.3.3  Contentment and Contentiousness: The Expansionary Phase of the 
Experiment, 1985-87 
The Strategy 
In  August  1985, President  Alan  Garcia  launched an economic  recovery 
program based on this set of  unconventional economic premises and guide- 
lines. As Ortiz de Zevallos (1989) describes, the program had been assembled 
in a three-day emergency summit shortly before the inauguration. The nego- 
tiated program represented a compromise between a “cautious” group of  ad- 
visers,  the APRA’s own  economic  campaign  team,  and  a group of  “auda- 
cious” heterodox advisers of President Garcia. 
The compromise strategy  was  to prompt  a quick economic  recovery  by 
boosting consumption  demand, which would be accommodated by existing 
slack industrial capacity. Consumption demand would be fueled by increasing 
real  wages,  implementing  direct  subsidy programs  and  temporary  employ- 
ment-generating public works in marginal areas, and transferring disposable 
income from the public  sector to the private  sector. The latter was effected 
through reducing taxes and freezing public sector prices and tariffs. The use 
of  slack capacity would be guaranteed by closing the domestic market to im- 
ports competing with domestic production. In addition, the government insti- 
tuted a price, cost, interest rate, and exchange rate freeze geared to breaking 
inflationary expectations. The main policy measures included in the program 
are presented in table 9.3. Table 9.3  Main Policy Measures of “Plan de Emergencia” from August 1985 to December 1986 
Taxes and Public-Sector  Public Expenditure 
Wages and Employment  Exchange Rate  Interest Rates  Tariffs and Prices  Private-Sector Prices  and Social Programs 
Periodic nominal hikes so 
as to reach a 7% annual 
increase in real terms. 
In practice, minimum 
real wages rose 34% in 
the 17-month period. 
Tax exemption to employ- 
ees on the share of  in- 
come tax paid by  them. 
Two one-time interest-tree 
loans to civil servants. 
Reduction of probation 
period from three years 
to three months. 
Establishment of  PROEM 
allowing firms to hire 
temporary workers for 
up to two years without 
adhering to labor stabil- 
ity laws. 
Initial 12% devaluation 
and subsequent freeze 
of  official rate. 
Later. introduction of mul- 
tiple exchange rates; 
first, only for exports 
and then for imports as 
well. 
Lending rate of commer- 
cial banks: gradual re- 
duction from 280%)  to 
40% annual rate. 
Saving rate (one year de- 
posits): gradual reduc- 
tion from 107% to 
314. 
Lending rate by  Agrarian 
Bank: 
a)  Regular rate reduced 
from 116% to 25% 
b)  Establishment facil- 
ity at zero interest rate 
for the Andean high- 
lands farmers 
Reduction of sales tax rate 
from  I  I% to 68. 
Enhanced tax exemptions to 
selected sectors on sales 
tax, import tariffs, and 
other taxes. 
Freeze of public-sector 
prices and tariffs. In Feb- 
ruary 1986, reduction of 
water and electricity tariffs 
by  20% and of prices of 
petroleum products by 
10%. 
Freeze of  all prices. 
Later periodic adjustment 
and/or liberalization of 
most agricultural prices. 
Creation of a price author- 
ity (CIPA) coordinated 
by the Ministry of  Fi- 
nance. 
Establishment of the fol- 
lowing programs total- 
ling expenditures of 
about 2% of GDP 
a) FRASA: to fund 
price support schemes 
and subsidies for agri- 
cultural products. 
b)  PAIT temporary la- 
bor-works programs in 
marginal areas. 
c) Support to peasant 
communities. 
d) Microregional devel- 
opment in emergency 
zones. 
e)  PAD: direct support 
program to provide so- 
cial services and food in 
the pueblos jovenes 
(shanty towns). 
Establishment of  credit 
lines and /or credit 
guarantee facilities for 
microentrepreneurs by 
the newly created 
IDESI, Peru’s Develop- 
ment Finance Corpora- 
tion (COFIDE), and the 
Industrial Bank. 275  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
Peru’s pervasive and often romanticized informal sector would be  instru- 
mental in both the output recovery and employment generation. The demand 
boost, together with the establishment of several credit and credit-guarantee 
programs for microentrepreneurs, would stimulate the informal sector. The 
agricultural sector was also made a high priority: guaranteed prices to produc- 
ers of  the main staples were significantly raised, input subsidies increased, 
and lines of  agricultural credit on preferential terms considerably expanded. 
The poor campesinos of  the sierra, the most backward part of  the country, 
would be the main beneficiaries. Raising incomes in  the sierra also had the 
key purpose of pacifying this terrorism-stricken part of the country. 
The necessary resources to finance the strategy were to become available 
from reductions in external debt payments and from Central Bank financing. 
The political rhetoric was confrontational with external creditors and concili- 
atory with domestic economic agents-designed  to bring about contentment 
at home and contentiousness abroad. 
The government’s heterodox economic program, oficially termed the Plan 
de Emergencia, was expected to last  12 months, from August  1985 to July 
1986, but was subsequently extended through December 1986. The authori- 
ties stated that this recovery program, based on consumption-led expansion, 
could only last insofar as there was unutilized capacity. Therefore, the govern- 
ment envisaged a  second phase for the postrecovery  era where the focus 
would be on investment and exports, so as to make the transition from short- 
run output expansion to long-run sustainable growth. However, the economic 
strategy to be followed in the second phase was never consistently developed. 
Furthermore, the measures implemented to prompt the recovery were at vari- 
ance with the rules of the game required to promote investment, exports, and 
growth. It was assumed that the government would be able to negotiate (con- 
certur) with business groups the reinvestment of the profits accrued during the 
boom into export industries. 
The Consumption Boom 
After a few months of initial sluggishness, the response of the economy to 
the program was an unprecedented output expansion. The GDP expanded 9.5 
percent in 1986 and 7.8 percent in 1987 (fig. 9.1 and table 9.4). Along with 
output, employment in the formal sector of the economy grew by a cumulative 
12 percent in the two-year period (fig. 9.2),  mainly through temporary recruit- 
ment under the newly instituted temporary employment program (PROEM). 
This program enabled employers to circumvent the government’s decision of 
reducing probation from three years to three months as well as other restrictive 
layoff procedures in  Peru’s labor legislation. The price-cost freeze, coupled 
with initially moderate monetary policy, reduced inflation from 200 percent in 
the 12-month period immediately preceding the freeze to 63 percent in 1986 
(fig.  9.3). Real wages  grew 24 percent over the  two-year period.  During 
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Fig. 9.1  Evolution of real GDP and real wages (1985 = 100) 
agricultural price guarantees, and huge input and credit subsidies for agricul- 
ture translated  into a 90 percent  improvement in rural-urban  terms of  trade 
and a corresponding  significant improvement of agricultural incomes.  Some 
basic macroeconomic indicators are presented in table 9.4. 
These results,  however, were reached at the expense of  growing financial 
and  external  imbalances  and  of  increasing  misalignments  in  key  relative 
prices. These imbalances, in turn, signaled that the model being followed was 
unsustainable and that the economy would lapse into an open crisis if correc- 
tive measures were not adopted. First, total public-sector revenues dropped 
by  a cumulative  18 percent of  GDP in  1985-87.9  In turn, foreign exchange 
and financial losses of the Central Bank-resulting  from the operation of the 
multiple exchange rate system and interest rate subsidies, respectively-grew 
rapidly to a level equal to 3.7 percent of GDP in 1987. As a result, and not- 
withstanding a reduction in public investment, the public-sector imbalance- 
as gauged  by  the  domestic  financing of  the  public-sector  deficit-jumped 
from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1985 to 10.5 percent in 1987. The decline in the 
ratio of public investment to GDP was largely a “cost of  default,” rather than 
a conscious decision, because many projects depended on either foreign tech- 
nology or were linked to foreign financing. The minister of planning put it this 
way: 
9. Here we refer to public-sector revenues as defined by simply adding tax revenues and state 
enterprise gross revenues (excluding transfers from the government). Obviously, there is double 
counting and other problems with this measure, but it provides a very good rough graphical indi- 
cator of  the total revenue loss. 277  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
Table 9.4  Main Economic Indicators, 1980-89 
Average, 
1980-84  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Real GDP growth (%) 
Real per capital GDP growth (%) 
Real consumption growth (%) 
Inflation rate (%) 
Broad money supply growth (%) 
Public-sector borrowing require- 
ments (% of  GDP) 
Tax revenues/GDP (%) 
Public enterpnses revenue/GDP 
Current account deficit/GDP (’7.)” 
Gross international reserves (in 
Millions of  U.S. dollars) 
Foreign debUGDP (%’.)” 
Accrued debt service ratio (%) 
Paid debt service ratio (%) 
Real exchange rate (December 
Terms of  trade ( 1978 = 100) 
Real wage (1979 =  100) 
Employment growth (%) 
Utilized capacity index (%) 
(%) 
1978 = 100yd 
-  1.0 
-  3.6 
















2.4  9.5  7.8  -8.8  -  10.4 
-  .2  6.9  5.2  -11.4  -13.0 
2.3  13.3  8.3  -  11.5  -7.5 
158.3  62.9  114.5  1,722.3  2,775.3 
5.8  9.1  12.9  15.6  9.8 
122.4  64.4  113.0  585.1  2,028.7 
14.9  12.4  8.9  9.1  5.4 
26.1  18.4  14.1  8.9  7.2 
.3  6.0  7.2  7.4  1 .o 
2,283.0  1,861.0  1,130.0  1,125.0  1,512.0 
76.8  67.8  62.4  77.0  103.5 
22.5  19.6  13.4  5.4  5.6 
99.6  86.8  74.9  91.2  59.0 
69.8  77.9  77.0  79.3  64.0 
90.6  66.4  66.9  72.8  68.9 
64  73  79  60  29 
45.0  71.0  79.0  59.0  46.0 
1.9  6.4  4.7  -6.5  -3.6 
Source: National Statistical Institute, Central Reserve Bank, Ministry of  Finance and author’s estimates. 
’Ratios obtained using the July 1985-based purchasing power parity exchange rate. 
hIncludes  interest imputed on arrears. 
cEvaluated at the weighted average of  all current commercial exchange rates (intis per US$). 
dAn increase  in  the  series means real  depreciation  of  the effective exchange  rate for trade  accounts 
transactions. 
The deficit,  including  unpaid  interest  due  on  the  foreign  debt, was  the 
equivalent of  about 5.6 percent of  Gross Domestic Product in  1986. One 
reason why it was not larger is that the state companies have spent less than 
they were supposed to. Up to the end of September, the figures show state 
companies using only 30 percent of  their budget, partly  because of prob- 
lems getting foreign financing, quarrels with foreign companies contracted 
by previous governments, investigations and so on. It was a disaster. lo 
Second, the real exchange rate appreciated 26 percent  between July  1985 
and October 1987. This, together with booming aggregate demand, made the 
GDP expansion highly import intensive contrary to the initial designs of  the 
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Fig. 9.4  International reserves of the Central Bank 
government. With the parallel decline in exports, the external current account 
went from near equilibrium in  1985 to a deficit of about 6.5 percent of  GDP 
in  1986-87.  The ultimate effect of this was a sustained drop of  net intema- 
tional reserves from a peak of $1.5 billion in March  1986 to roughly zero in 
December  1987 (fig.  9.4).”  Third, the  focus  on boosting consumption  re- 
duced the potential for investing the surplus gained by the external morato- 
rium, thereby trading off  short-run expansion for future sustainable growth. 
It should be noted that the demand-led course was initially counteracted to 
some extent by the Central Bank. During its first five months, the new admin- 
istration had maintained the governor of the Central Bank of the previous ad- 
ministration.  In this period, monetary policy was reasonably restrictive in an 
attempt, on the one hand, to sterilize the huge balance of payments surpluses 
(reserve inflows) originating from the limitation on foreign debt service pay- 
ments, and, on the other hand, to decelerate the growth of monetary aggre- 
gates in accordance with  the lower rate of  inflation achieved with the price 
freeze (table 9.5). To  this end, tighter legal reserve requirements  were im- 
posed on commercial banks’ deposits, and although interest rates were scaled 
down, initially this reduction was matched by a similar decline in inflation, 
and thus real interest rates did not fall further. In August  1985, foreign cur- 
l l. However, gross reserves reported by the Central Bank in December 1987 still totaled $ l.  l 
billion (with  $800 million  in gold). But Peru needed a large carryover of  reserves to finance 
imports because the default had caused a withdrawal of  external trade finance. Table 9.5  Financial Survey: Uses and Sources of Broad Money’ (Percentage Changes with Respect to the Stock of Broad Money Outstanding 
at the End of the Previous Period, Six-Month Rates) 
1985  1985  1986  1986  1987  1987  1988  1988  1989  1989  1990 
I  I1  1  I1  I  I1  1  11  I  I1  1 
A. Broad Money Supply (Uses) 
I. Money 
2. Near money 
Domestic currency 
Foreign currency 
B. Broad Money Supply (Sources) 
I. Net international reserves 
2. Domestic credit to nonfinancial 
3. Domestic credit to private sector 
4. Net unclassified assets 
Base money growthb 
Inflation ratec 
Money supply multipliel-d 
Income velocity of broad money: 
public sector 
Memo items: 
Including dollar-indexed deposits 
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46.2 
26.5 























35.4  34.3 
20.5  12.6 
14.9  21.7 
17.9  21.7 
-  3.0  .o 
35.4  34.3 
-7.6  -2.0 
22.0  11.7 
33.0  32.0 
-11.9  -7.3 
13.3  27.1 
26.8  40.1 
1.7  1.8 
3.6  3.7 













































-  86.1 
443.1  292.0 
113.1  107.4 
330.0  184.6 
175.9  132.8 
154.1  51.8 
443.1  292.0 
87.1  42.4 
27.5  63.7 
290.8  149.5 
37.7  36.3 
365.8  226.2 
601.2  310.0 
1.9  2.2 
9.5  9.8 
















Sources: Central Reserve Bank and author’s estimates. 
’Includes all financial operations of  financial institutions of  the formal sector (banks and other nonbank) with economic agents 
bAs  a percentage of the previous period’s base money (six-month rate). 
<Inflation  for the semester (six-month rate). 
dThe ratio of broad money to the base money. 281  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
rency  deposits were  made redeemable only  in local currency at the official 
exchange rate plus a small premium. Monetary policy eased in the first half of 
1986 and became overtly expansionary in the second half. 
When the price and cost freeze was lifted in December 1986, price controls 
on several groups of products were eased somewhat. In January  1987, a mild 
crawling peg  for the  two  benchmark  exchange rates  was  instituted.  The 
“crawl”  was halted  in July  1987 following  concerns over inflationary pres- 
sures. 
The Rise and Fall  of Private-Sector Conjidence 
Prior to 1987, private-sector confidence in and support of  the government’s 
economic policy  could only be  described  as being  unanimous.  In  his July 
1986 presidential  address, President Alhn  Garcia reaffirmed  the partnership 
with the private sector and ruled out expropriation  or other statist measures. 
Negotiations (concertacion) were continuously carried out during the second 
half of  1986 to persuade the principal industrial groups (the so-called twelve 
apostles)  to invest  in  export-oriented  businesses.  Virtually  every  incentive 
was  open for negotiation:  preferential  exchange rates, credit  subsidies, tax 
exemptions, and so on. 
The troubles  started in  1987, when some sources began claiming that the 
private sector, while benefiting from the boom, was not delivering the quid 
pro quo of reinvesting surpluses so as to contribute to exports and growth. As 
this  view  was  not  corroborated by  provisional  Central  Bank  estimates- 
which indicated that private investment had grown  18 percent between 1985 
and  1986-the  National  Planning  Institute  commissioned  an  independent 
study in early 1987 to analyze investment data from the financial statements 
of 62 firms listed in the stock exchange (Thorne 1986). The study found that 
in  1986 gross fixed investment had grown at most 7 percent and that most of 
this  increase  could be accounted for by inventory  accumulation.  Moreover, 
the firms that were investing  more were those oriented  to the internal mar- 
ket-just  the contrary to the government’s wishes. 
The paradox was that, in practice, while seeking to induce firms to switch 
into export-oriented investments, the government  was shifting all incentives 
toward the internal market. Indeed, by 1987 all imports were made subject to 
both an import license and a foreign exchange license,  whereas in  1985, 61 
percent of all tariff code items stood free from quantitative restrictions.  Simi- 
larly, the maximum tariff rate had been raised from 91 percent in 1985 to 155 
percent in 1987. 
Table 9.6 shows that the claim of unresponsive  private investment turned 
out  to  be  unfounded.  Final  official  data  revealed  that  private  investment 
doubled  between  1985 and  1987, although it is true that the major share of 
new investment was in construction and inventories rather than in equipment. 
In the wake of  the contention over private investment,  the government tried 282  Ricardo Lago 
Table 9.6  GDP  and Aggregate Demand‘ (Index Numbers in Real Terms) 


























































137.4  124.5 
116.9  106.6 
20.5  17.9 
137.4  124.5 
88.9  78.6 
78.1  70.4 
10.8  8.2 
26.5  25.5 
7.9  5.7 
14.8  14.0 
3.8  5.8 
22.0  20.3 
21.8  22.3 















Source: National Statistical Institute and Central Reserve Bank. 
aThe  average GDP for 1980-84  was taken as the base (GDP in 1980-84  = 100). As a result, all 
figures in the table are index numbers refered to the average GDP of 1980-84  and should be read 
as proportions of GDP of that period. 
first a highly subsidized investment scheme,  l2 and, shortly thereafter, devised 
a compulsory program aimed at forcing private firms to invest in export activ- 
ities. Under this program, a large percentage of firms’ profits had to be traded 
for compulsory investment bonds. 
The honeymoon was finally over when President Garcia launched his initia- 
tive to nationalize  private commercial banks and insurance companies and to 
establish foreign exchange controls. These measures were announced in his 
second annual address to the nation in July  1987. These political events, to- 
gether with the emerging concerns on the sustainability of the economic pro- 
gram as exemplified  by the free fall of  international  reserves,  triggered  the 
onset of the crisis, with the free market exchange rate commanding growing 
spreads over the official rate (figs. 9.4 and 9.5). 
The “1  0 Percent Default” :  Rhetoric and Practice 
President Garcia’s announcement, in July 1985, of the 10 percent of exports 
cap on debt payments broke with the arrears-cum-best-effort-to-pay  tenet of 
the last  Belaunde years.  Shortly thereafter,  Peru’s debt was declared value 
impaired by the United States. The government attempted unsuccessfully  to 
convince credits that new debt commitments would be fully serviced while 
old debt would, as a rule, be serviced only when creditors provided a positive 
12. The Fondo de Inversion  y Empleo granted prospective investors of approved export projects, 
largely located outside Lima, a cost-free equity contribution from the government equal to one- 
third of  the project cost. 283  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
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Fig. 9.5  Spread between parallel and official exchange rates 
net transfer to Peru. Therefore, the trick with the 10 percent rule was that Peru 
would only pay as long as creditors provided the money to pay themselves. 
The reality  was that,  rhetoric to the contrary,  from July  1985 to December 
1986 Peru’s actual debt service to creditors was around 20 percent of exports 
for public debt alone (table 9.7) and over 25 percent of exports for total debt, 
and the negative net transfer was almost as high as it had been in the last two 
Belaunde years. The assumption, later proven erroneous, that Peru could se- 
lectively default against some creditors while obtaining financing from others 
led progressively to defaults with initially nontargeted creditor groups. It was 
only in  1988 that total debt service descended to the 10 percent limit. 
In August 1986, Peru was declared ineligible for IMF lending, and one year 
later was placed on “nonaccrual” status by the World Bank. In early 1989, the 
Inter-American Development Bank also took the step of classifying Peru as a 
nonaccrual country due to protracted default. In 1986, the external debt mor- 
atorium was extended to private-sector liabilities.  In  his second presidential 
address to the nation in July 1986, President Garcia announced the suspension 
for two years of both  private  debt service and profit repatriation  by foreign 
corporations. 
Another contentious issue was the renegotiation of exploration and produc- 
tion contracts with the three multinationals operating in Peru’s hydrocarbons 
sector.  Arguing  that the hydrocarbons  law issued by  the previous  Belaunde 
administration had not paid due regard to the interests of  the nation, the au- 
thorities forced renegotiation of the contracts under less favorable conditions. 
One of  the three multilaterals,  Belco, refused to accept the new conditions, 284  Ricardo Lago 
Table 9.7  Debt Service Payments on Public External Debt’ 
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Central bank debt 








Total debt service 















































Source: Central Reserve Bank and author’s estimates. 
‘Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization actually paid. 
bAmount  paid as a percentage of exports of good and nonfactor sevices. 
leading to termination of  the contract in 1986 and de facto, to expropriation 
of the assets without compensation. 
Growing isolation from creditors and foreign investors inevitably meant 
growing isolation from trading partners, rendering Peru particularly vulner- 
able to import restrictions in creditor nations and contributing to vanishing 
domestic confidence. 
9.3.4  Decline and Despair: The Recessionary Phase of the Experiment, 
1988-90 
By late 1987, the dynamics of the economics and the politics of the experi- 
ment  turned  an  originally  “well-orchestrated,’’  center-right,  “demand-led 
boom” into an openly confrontational, both abroad and at home, populist ex- 
periment. Net international reserves had reached “the red,” Central Bank ex- 
ternal deposits had to be moved from one country to another to avoid potential 
seizure by creditors, letters of credit for imports had to be collateralized with 
cash, and the Central Bank had to start drawing down gold reserves.13  Public- 
sector real prices and tariffs, running on average at less than half of their levels 
of  July  1985, were adjusted infrequently and insufficiently. The number of 
exchange rate categories increased from three in  1985 to nine in mid-1987. 
The Agrarian Bank continued allocating low- or zero-interest loans to farm- 
ers, and wage increases continued to be granted by decree every four months. 
Meanwhile, the domestic financing of the public-sector imbalance had soared 
from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1985 to close to 10.5 percent in 1987 (table 9.8). 
13. In January 1988 the business newsletter “Efficacia” published the names of the international 
banks in which Peru’s Central Bank  maintained its reserves at the time. During the following days 
the Central Bank  had to redeploy its reserves elsewhere (Peru Reporting EIRL 1988a). 285  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
In a country  with  a very  narrow  financial  system, this represented  a huge 
burden for the Central Bank to finance. Hence, an inflationary momentum was 
set in motion, with inflation jumping from 64 percent in  1986 to 115 percent 
in 1987. 
Despite the  unfolding crisis, policymakers  still remained unconvinced of 
the need for macroeconomic  stabilization.  Some sectors maintained  that al- 
though high capacity utilization had been achieved in several industrial sec- 
tors, other sectors still registered slack capacity. Since, on average, capacity 
use was still 70 percent, the doubling of  inflation could not be attributed to 
excess  demand  pressures.  Measuring  excess  demand  in  real  and  static 
Keynesian effective demand instead of  in  nominal and dynamic terms was a 
Table 9.8  Public Finance, 1984-87  (%  of GDP) 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
I. Public-sector revenues 
Tax revenues 
State enterprises reve- 
nues 
2. Public-sector expenditures 
of which, investment 
of which, wages 
3. Nonfinancial public-sector 
deficit (2-1) 
4. Central bank losses 
5. Overall deficit (3+4) 
6. Central bank transfers to 
development banks 




of which, extant inter- 





































































































Source; Central Reserve Bank and author’s estimates. 
Note:  The reason why gross revenues of  state enterprises and gross expenditures of  the public 
sector are used here is to show the reader the phenominal decline of the ratios to GDP of both 
items.  We  are, however, aware of  the imperfections implied by  these measures.  In  particular, 
adding tax revenues and state enterprise revenues (item 1) implies double counting of  taxes paid 
by state enterprises. Besides, state enterprise revenues are gross and thus not strictly income. The 
same occurs with item 2, which is the sum of  central government expenditures and public enter- 
prise gross expenditures (the latter including intermediate expenditures and therefore not strictly 
comparable with Central Government expenditures, which are final aggregate demand). Double 
counting, however, affects equally both revenues and expenditures and therefore does not alter 
the deficit figures. 286  Ricardo Lago 
very  common analytical  framework used  at the time  (Postigo  de la Motta 
1988, p. 21). Some sources even suggested selectively “targeting” aggregate 
demand to sectors with slack capacity, while others came to defend that indus- 
trial capacity was still underutilized  in most sectors since industry was oper- 
ating on average at less than two shifts while full use was at three shifts of 
eight hours each. 
On the eve of its collapse, the designers of  the program published the book 
El Peru Heterodox0 (Carbonetto et al.  1987), in which they claimed to have 
discovered a new policy approach and recommended the application of their 
model to other countries: 
At the time of  sending this book to print we are witnessing the first one and 
a half years of  the implementation of Peru’s reactivation policy. The results 
obtained prove most of the guiding thesis according to which it is possible 
to reactivate (in the presence of  slack capacity) and simultaneously reduce 
inflation. (p. 16) 
We trust the book will be a useful tool for developing countries confronting 
similar problems to ours. (p. i) 
The glamorous boom seduced even some foreign academics. In June 1987, 
a few months before the devastating collapse, Rosemary Thorp, after an in 
situ examination of the evolution of  the program, and notwithstanding a few 
disclaimers, wrote: 
Gradually both the thinking behind the policy approach and its actual im- 
plementation  have become more coherent, more interesting and more au- 
dacious. It is too early still to define phases, since the development has been 
continuous, marked by the appearance of  coherent planning models for the 
Planning Institute (the first dated May 1986) and by the beginning of think- 
ing on how reactivation should become growth and resulting policy initia- 
tives in the second half of 1986. . . . The three areas in which new thinking 
has been most conspicuous and impressive are closely interrelated: concer- 
tacion, the  external sector,  and  the  issue of  long run  structural  change. 
Short-term price and exchange rate management have also evolved-less 
confidently. (Thorp 1987, p. 5) 
The Failed Stubilization Attempts 
With the pressure of rapidly vanishing international reserves (fig. 9.4), fail- 
ure to have adjusted the exchange rates for exporters as well as the fact of 
having channeled subsidies indiscriminately  to all  sectors, instead of  a few 
priority sectors, were made the culprits for all troubles. The increasingly mea- 
ger fiscal and foreign exchange resources prompted the National Planning In- 
stitute to launch  its proposal  for “selective growth”  in late  1987. Subsidies 
channeled through foreign exchange, taxes, tariffs, credit, or any other means 
would, from then on, be addressed exclusively to predefined priority sectors. 
The problem was not the size of the subsidies per se, but rather that a large 287  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
part had been wasted on promoting undeserving sectors (Postigo de la Motta 
1988, pp. 28-31).  Also in late  1987, the Ministry of  Economy proposed a 
Programa Trienal that set the policies and targets for the next three years in 
the  areas of  increasing  the tax-burden  ratio,  simplifying the exchange  rate 
structure, and divesting several public enterprises. These measures sought to 
partially reverse the precarious financial situation and cumbersome incentive 
structure, but were to a larger degree designed as a strategy for resumed dia- 
logue with multilateral credit agencies. This rapprochement to the multilater- 
als has been viewed as an application of President Garcia’s theory of the two 
fronts: the country could be in contentiousness either on the external front or 
the domestic front, but not simultaneously in both. Since the nationalization 
of  the banking  system had  damaged  relations at home, it was necessary to 
portray improved attitudes abroad. Nevertheless, neither selective growth nor 
the Programa Trienal were carried through.  Instead, a sequence of destabil- 
izing economic measures started to unfold. 
Since late  1987, the Central Bank started systematically to adjust the ex- 
change rates for exporters without passing on the higher price of  dollars on to 
importers. The best of both worlds was being pursued.  By August 1988, the 
Central Bank was on average selling foreign exchange to importers at half the 
price it paid to exporters. Thus, foreign exchange losses in 1988 reached 3.8 
percent of GDP, adding to an already precarious budget imbalance. 
Three major one-shot economic packages were implemented during 1988: 
in March, September, and November. Table 9.9 presents the key elements of 
these packages. In the three cases the measures finally announced,  although 
they  embedded the same approach  to adjustment as the technical proposal 
prepared by the economic team, had undergone a tough political  filter.  l4 The 
three announced  packages  were  very  similar.  Namely,  they  decreed adjust- 
ments in public prices, exchange rates, interest rates, and wages. In addition, 
the first two included a follow-up  120-day freeze on prices,  wages, and the 
exchange rate, and the second declared the unification of the exchange rates 
for commercial transactions (thereby transferring subsidies for several highly 
subsidized food and agricultural imports to the budget). 
With the exception of  the November package, nominal wage hikes were, in 
general, granted  at higher rates than those decreed for regulated prices  and 
exchange rates. In the March package the highest price adjustment was set at 
51 percent  while minimum  wages were raised  by 60 percent; in turn, in the 
September package the effective exchange rate was devalued by 95 percent- 
although  the  largely  irrelevant  official rate  was  devalued  by  600-plus  per- 
cent-while  minimum wages were raised by  150 percent. Economic policy- 
making  had, thus, engaged  in  the  impossible  task  of  trying  to narrow  the 
14. Peru  Reporting  EIRL (1988a.  1988b.  1988c) and  weekly  magazines: Si (28 November 
1988, pp. 6,  7) and Oiga (12 December 1988, pp. 13-15).  These press accounts illustrate Presi- 
dent Garcia’s personal involvement, in great detail, in economic policy-making. Table 9.9  Packages of Economic Measures, October 1987 through November 1988 
1987  1988 
October  December  March  September  November 
PRICES, WAGES AND EX- 
CHANGE RATE 
Effective rate (devaluation) (%) 




Minimum wage increases (%) 
Public sector wage increases (%) 
Private sector wage increases (%) 




controlled products (%) 
























+Sales tax from 6% to 
10% 
+Increase in all excise 
taxes 
+Indexation to inflation of 
prepayments of corpo- 
rate profit taxes 
+Elimination of exemp- 
tions under import sur- 
charge 
+ Adjustment & 120-day 
freeze (export exchange 













+Sales tax to  10.5% 
+ Adjustment & 120-day 













+Increase of excise tax 
rates on beer and ciga- 
rettes 
+Reduction of exemptions 
on import tariffs 













+Partial indexation of tax 
liabilities to inflation 
+Reduction of excise 
taxes (cigarettes and li- 
quors) 
+ Ad-valorem custom du- 
ties: from 10% to  16% 
+On exports: 10% +Minimum duty to im 
ports: 5% 
+On purchases of foreign  +Tax on personal prop 
exchange: 25%  erty: 14% 
New taxes 
IMPORT TARIFFS AND RE- 
STRICTIONS 
Evolution of quantitative restric- 
tions (QRs) (% of total of tariff 
categories): 
Free from QRs (96) 
License required (%) 
Import prohibitions (Q) 
Evolution of tariffs. 
Average tariff (%) 
Maximum tariff (%I 
EXPORTS MEASURES 
INTEREST RATE 
Lending rate (%) 
Deposit rate (%) 
+On exports: 4% 
+All imports subject to li-  + Import licenses need ap-  +Some imports can be  ti-  +Shift of  35% of imports 
censes  proval of Institute of  nanced with the import-  from official exchange 
Foreign Trade (ICE) and  er's own foreign ex-  rate market 






From 32 to 40  To 55 






CLDa from 10  to 30 
To 255  20 per month 
To 219  17 per month 
'The Certificados de Libre Disponibilidad (CLD) is a tradable dollar certificate given to exporters for a share of their export porceeds that can be used by an importer. 290  Ricardo Lago 
internal and external imbalances without requiring economic agents to adjust 
ex ante their budget constraints. 
Indeed, narrowing the budgetary gap required, in addition to tax measures, 
an increase in the relative prices of goods and services provided by the public 
sector in terms of nominal wages. At the same time, correcting the external 
imbalance required an increase in the ratio of the nominal exchange rate to 
nominal wages.  Moreover, reducing inflation required that the adjustment of 
these two key relative prices be effected with at most a moderate escalation of 
these three key sets of prices. The policy course taken was just the opposite, 
namely, small adjustments in the relative prices with high nominal escalation 
of absolute prices. The paradox was that the September package was officially 
termed the “double-zero” plan, for it was intended to eliminate both the fiscal 
deficit and Central Bank inflationary financing. But, as explained below, the 
president of the Central Bank took the plan seriously. 
The Trigger Point of  Hyperinflation: Laffer Curves, Snowballs, 
and Social Turmoil 
Monetarists think of inflation as too much money chasing too few goods, 
while flow of funds believers view inflation as a dirty transfer of real resources 
from individuals and firms to the public sector and other favored sectors, and 
yet structuralists think of it as the result of a race between prices, wages, and 
exchange rates reflecting the struggle for the distribution of income. 
The three aforementioned  packages  failed the three tests: the monetarist, 
the structuralist and the flow of funds consistency. Indeed, by the second quar- 
ter of  1988 inflation had surpassed the level that would generate the “maxi- 
mum-inflation  tax”  (fig. 9.6).  Is  Furthermore, gross real resources raised  by 
the government through inflation did not contribute much to closing the non- 
financial public-sector gap, for these resources were largely transferred back 
as foreign exchange and  financial  subsidies, the  latter particularly,  but  not 
exclusively, to peasants (table 9.10). Even worse, the dynamics were explo- 
sive since, as the gross inflation tax was sliding down the inefficient portion 
of the Laffer curve, real financial subsidies were rising because nominal inter- 
est  rates  lagged  increasingly  behind  inflation.  In parallel,  the  evolution  of 
wages, prices, and exchange rates was setting into motion a snowball, which 
aggravated inflationary dynamics and expectations. 
By late 1988, the economy had taken off on a hyperinflationary  path, with 
inflation accelerating  from an annual rate of  360 percent  in the first half to 
nearly 7,000 percent in the second half, and real money plummeting to one- 
third  of  its  level one year earlier  (figs.  9.3 and 9.7). Economic agents had 
15. The trade-off between inflation and real resources raised through inflation presented in fig. 
9.6 was calculated by  Lago (1989). It results from fitting the path followed by inflation and real 
money, from the second semester of  1987 to the first of  1988, into Philip Cagan’s demand for 
money.  it is therefore  an  arch estimate  and not a regression result.  It  is presented only as an 
illustration of the Laffer curve. 291  Peru’s Heterodox Expcrlencc 
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Fig. 9.6  Laffer curve: Revenues from inflation/GDP 
Table 9.10  Inflation Tax, inflation Subsidy, and Net Inflation Tax (% of GDP) 
Net 
Year  Tax  Subsidy  Tax 
Inflation  In flation  Inflation 
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-  .9 





Source; Based on a very  detailed calculation performed by  Oks (1989) of the effect of  inflation 
on financial assets and liabilities of  the consolidated public sector (including the Central Bank 
and all public banks). 
interpreted the government’s corrective attempts as destabilizing, prompting a 
massive rush to the dollar, unprecedented black market premia (up to 400%) 
and the continuation of a free fall of both GDP and real wages that had initi- 
ated in early 1988 (fig. 9.1). Hyperrecession walked hand in hand with hyper- 
inflation. 
The  recession  was  prompted  by  the  collapse  of  private  investment- 
brought about by the unstable inflationary trend-and  also by the downfall of 292  Ricardo Lago 
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Fig. 9.7  Broad money supply and its sources (in real terms) 
public-sector real aggregate demand. The latter resulted from the increasingly 
diminished expenditure capability, in real terms, of the public sector, in turn a 
consequence of shrinking real tax returns and state-enterprise revenues, and a 
vanishing real demand for money. These recessionary effects of falling invest- 
ment and government  expenditures  were compounded  by the dirty work of 
second-round multiplier effects on real consumption. 
The sharp decline of labor incomes resulted from the procyclical character 
of  real  wages and the reduced  scope and imperfection  of  wage indexation. 
Indeed, only unionized workers-about  half a million of  a total labor force of 
over six million-were  subject to indexation clauses, and even for these quar- 
terly  indexation  adjustments  were  significantly  below  inflation  because  the 
government  established  by  law nominal inti ceilings to any indexed adjust- 
ment, which soon became binding. Regarding minimum wages, public-sector 
wages, and wages of nonunion workers, the government decreed frequent ad- 
justments, but  inflation  always  kept  a faster pace. Escalating  inflation  de- 
pressed real wages so fast that soon private employers started to pay higher 
wages  than  those  resulting  from contractual  or regulatory  obligations.  The 
low degree of wage indexation acted as a stabilizing force of the hyperinfla- 
tionary trend. 
Labor unrest soared amid widespread protests by unions, prompted by im- 
perfect indexation of wages, and shortages of basic foodstuffs. Hours lost in 
strikes increased tenfold and were particularly acute in the two largest mining 
firms, the multinational Southern Copper Peru and the state-owned Centromin 
(fig. 9.8).  Peru’s terrorist Shining Path found in the crisis a promising breed- 293  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
ing ground. The situation at the time has been described by  Smith (1989) as 
follows: 
In November,  1988, guerrilla units of the Communist Party of Peru, better 
known as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), laid the final crossbeam in an 
Andes-spanning  strategy. They knocked down a vital power line between 
Lima and the Mantaro hydroelectric plant in the central Sierra. When the 
state  electricity  company moved  to  repair  the  downed  pylons,  Sendero 
quickly  blasted  others. Sendero also sabotaged the rail  line between  the 
mining center of Cerro de Pasco and Lima. Senderista columns moved vi- 
ciously into the campesino communities  and agrarian cooperatives in the 
countryside around Huancayo, the breadbasket of the national capital. 
Lima tottered on the verge of social and economic disarray. Already reel- 
ing from Peru’s worst depression, the city and most of the coast sputtered 
on rationed electrical  power and rotated  blackouts and brownouts for six 
weeks. The troubled government of President Alan Garcia declared a state 
of emergency in Junin, joining seven other departments under military con- 
trol. Across a broad swath of Andean Sierra and Amazon jungle, roughly 
750 miles long and 200 miles wide, the government recognized that it could 
not maintain a semblance of authority and order. 
News reports claimed that the miners’ strikes could not be settled by merely 
yielding on wage demands because the Shining Path was blackmailing union 
leaders. The type of demands made by unions included some of a very politi- 
cal nature, such as asking the government not to engage in any dealings with 
Hours (Millions) 
1984  1985  1988  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Quarter 
Fig. 9.8  Hours lost in strikes (1984-90) 294  Ricardo Lago 
the multilateral  credit  institution.  The miners’  strike lasted  two  and  a half 
months, paralyzing Peru’s main foreign exchange earning sector and thus ag- 
gravating the foreign exchange crisis and inflationary expectations. 
Coronado and the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments 
Central Bankers witness the hard way the correlation between money, the 
free market exchange rate, reserve losses, and inflation. Peru’s Central Bank 
charter provides for a very independent Central Bank. Credit outstanding to 
the government is restricted to one-twelfth of the year’s tax revenues, and net 
international  reserves  are subject  to a minimum  legal  reserve  requirement 
equal to one and a half months of imports (based on the average of  the two 
previous years). l6 Central Bank independence is protected by the Constitution 
(Article  151) by  providing  that  its president and board members,  once ap- 
pointed, can be impeached only by the Senate. In addition, Article 149 of the 
Constitution obliges the Central Bank to publish very detailed information on 
the economic and financial situation of the country, which the Central Bank 
does, inter alia, with a weekly publication called the “Nota Semanal.” 
During the last two Belaunde years Central Bank Governor Richard Webb 
had already used the charter at its potential and succeeded in moderating the 
government’s public spending plans. History repeats itself. Pedro Coronado, 
a lawyer appointed governor in late 1987 and who had presided over the Cen- 
tral  Bank  during the inherited nightmare of  multiple exchange rates,  cheap 
credit windows, and frequent recourse to government financing, took the step 
of regaining Central Bank independence at the time of the so-called double- 
zero plan of September 1988. 
The tight new credit rule was to have been coordinated with the September 
and November adjustment measures which, at their original technical design, 
had been intended to reduce the government’s deficit. This was particularly 
the case with the adjustment designed by then-finance  minister Abel Salinas, 
who resigned in late November when his original proposal  was turned down 
by President Garcia. Despite the fact that the actual approved packages left 
unchecked the underlying budget imbalance, the Central Bank pursued a tight 
credit policy from September 1988 to July 1989. Only a fraction of the credit 
requests by the Treasury and public enterprises were accommodated,  on oc- 
casion in exchange for price adjustments or other policy measures. The public 
sector was forced to adjust expenditures and resort to domestic arrears. 
In November  1988, cargo ships loaded with wheat and corn supplied by 
USAID on grant terms waited idly day after day at Lima’s Callao Harbor for 
their freight charges to be paid by ENCI (Peru’s agricultural marketing board). 
The Central Bank was refusing to advance the funds to ENCI unless this insti- 
tution  would reduce subsidies.  The rumor was spreading that there was no 
bread in Lima because of the Central Bank’s monetarist policies. 
16. Ley Organica del B.C.R.P.,  Articles 46,47,48,  and 80,  82, respectively 295  Peru’s Heterodox Expcrience 
The credit crunch and its effects are illustrated in table 9.1 1. The effective 
flow  of  Central  Bank  domestic credit declined in  nominal terms in  several 
months and grew by very little in others. However, since an important share 
of  both the monetary base and the money  supply was in dollar-indexed ac- 
counts-which  revalued whenever  the exchange rate depreciated, as it did 
almost every month-the  domestic “source” of the money supply continued 
to grow. The credit crunch managed to progressively drive down the free mar- 
ket premium of the inti and international reserves started to build up. By mid- 
1989, net international reserves had increased by $500 million, or 2 percent 
of GDP. 
The Four-Months-Ahead Tablita 
Despite the credit squeeze, inflation did not decline significantly during the 
first half  of  1989. In January  1989 a new minister of finance announced a 
tablita or schedule of monthly changes of key prices for the next four months 
(table 9.12). Again, the strategy was one of  almost equiproportional  albeit 
declining overtime, escalation of the exchange rate, prices, and wages, much 
in the same vein as the one-shot packages of the previous year but with more 
frequent, and thus smaller, changes. As it turned out, actual adjustments to 
wages were higher than those for the exchange rate and public prices.  Pre- 
announced cost escalation, together with the credit squeeze, maintained the 
economy  in  stagnation at the hyperrecessed  plateau  reached  in late  1988, 
without helping on the inflation front. By June 1989, real wages and GDP had 
dropped by 67 percent and 23 percent, respectively, in comparison to Decem- 
ber 1987, while inflation hovered at 45 percent between December 1988 and 
April 1989. Eventually, however, the monetary cure produced its effects: since 
May 1989 monthly inflation receded to around 30 percent for 12 consecutive 
months. 
As the recession drove down import levels and some dynamic domestic 
producers shifted from the depressed internal market to exports, the economy 
started to run a large trade surplus (figs. 9.9 and 9.10). To a large extent, the 
inti counterpart of this surplus was absorbed in people’s portfolios because the 
free market exchange rate was appreciating in real terms (following the over- 
shooting in  late  1988) and  the  Central  Bank  was not  supplying  domestic 
credit.  Devaluation  expectations of  late  1988 and early  1989 became  frus- 
trated by the crunch and thus ex post returns in dollars of inti deposits, at the 
now-higher domestic interest rates, turned out to be higher than “betting on 
the dollar.” A significant part of the trade surplus, thus, went into intis instead 
of capital flight. The depressed level of output and imports translated into an 
unprecedented  real  appreciation of  the official and parallel exchange rates. 
From late 1988 to mid-1989, the official exchange rate appreciated 50 percent 
and the parallel rate appreciated 75 percent, in real terms, while the spread 
between both became virtually zero (figs. 9.5 and 9.11 and table 9.13). 
In hindsight, the paradox of the period from September 1988 to June 1989 Table 9.11  The Credit Crunch: September 1988 through June 1989 
September  October  November  December  January  February  March  April  May  June 
Central bank domestic credit (a). 
Central bank net international reserves 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Broad money growth (%)h 
Inflation spread (%) 
Free exchange ratelofficial exchange rate (%) 
Interest rates on deposits (monthly rates) ('70) 
Real GDP (1979 = 100) 
Real wage (July 1985 = 100) 
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-319  -323 
17.8  31.3 
47  43 
190  56 
17  21 
I03  96 









-6.5  1.2 
-45  79 
33.7  41.6 
49  29 
13  44 
21  21 
99  99 









aMonthly growth rate. Excluding losses arising from valuation adjustments on net dollars liabilities due to exchange rate devaluations, 
bA  significant part of  it indexed to the official exchange rate. 297  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
Table 9.12  The Preannouncement of Key Prices Four Months Ahead, 
February-May  1989 
January  February  March  April  May 
Exchange rate devaluation 
Announced  ...  31  20  12  12 
Actual  40  31  30  31  24 
Announced  ...  29  20  13  12 
Actual  62  29  28  44  0 
Announced  ...  24  in  12  10 
Actual  41  24  31  26  40 
Gasoline price increase 
Minimum wage increase 
Index 
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Fig. 9.9  Evolution of real GDP and real imports (1985 = 100) 
is that the Central Bank’s squeeze led to a massive buildup of international 
reserves, perhaps the least convenient avenue to have a good case to make 
with external creditors for the continuation of  a unilateral default. 
The monetary squeeze ended in  July  1989 in  the midst  of  strong  arm- 
twisting between the Central Bank and the executive. The issue under dispute 
was the use of the foreign exchange reserves for yet another reactivation run 
with a view to the upcoming municipal elections in November 1989 and pres- 
idential elections in early 1990. Of the seven members of  the Central Bank 
board, Coronado lost the one-vote margin that had permitted him to pursue 
credit  restraint  since  September  1988; he  resigned.  From  then  on,  Luis 
Guiulfo, who had systematically opposed any violation to the charter all along 298  Ricardo Lago 
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Fig. 9.10  Exports and imports of goods (1984-89) 
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Fig. 9.11 
Nore: An increase in the Index of  Real Exchange Rate means real depreciation. The index refers 
to the effective exchange rate. 
Real exchange rate and terms of trade (first half of 1984 = 100) Table 9.13  Nominal and Real Exchange Rates, 1985-90 
Parallel Exchange Market  Official Exchange Market 
Oficial Exchange Rate'  Average Effective Rateb 
Nominal  Real Exchange  Intis/  Nominal  Real Exchange  Intis/  Nominal  Real Exchange  Intis/ 
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90.0 Table 9.13  (continued) 
Official Exchange Market  Parallel Exchange Market 
Official Exchange Ratea  Average Effective Rateb 
Intisi  Nominal  Real Exchange  Intis/  Nominal  Real Exchange  Intisi  Nominal  Real Exchange 
























14.2  2.2 
14.6  2.2 
14.9  2.2 
15.2  2.2 
15.5  2.2 
15.9  2.5 
15.9  .o 
15.9  .o 
15.9  .o 
15.9  .o 
15.9  .o 
33.0  107.2 
33.0  .o 
33.0  .o 
33.0  .o 
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19.7  118.3 
37.6  132.8 
137.1  224.4 
4.8  156.6 
-25.3  82.5 
20.0  69.7 
39.6  65.7 
49.3  75.2 
-5.5  57.1 
.8  47.1 
31.2  49.2 
43.5  55.4 
7.1  49.1 
94.3  76.3 
5.7  61.3 
-3.6  46.3 
12.6  39.9 
65.9  49.9 
21.8  44.4 
76.4  59.8 
106.1  87.3 
Sources: Central Reserve Bank and author’s estimates. 
‘MUC stands for Mercado Unico de Cambios and is the official exchange rate. 
bWeighted average rate for all commercial transactions. There were multiple exchange rates. 
‘Percentage increase over previous month. 
dAn increase in the Real Exchange Rate Index means real depreciation. The base is December 1978. 302  Ricardo Lago 
since 1985, became the only member of the board favoring credit restraint. In 
the month of  July, money printing for government financing (a traditional ma- 
quinazo in  the  local jargon) increased by  21 percent,  compared to roughly 
zero in the previous semester (table 9.14). 
The “30-percent  Monthly Inflation” KnifeS Edge Equilibrium 
In  May  1989, President Alan  Garcia had  appointed his sixth minister of 
finance, a young economist of the left-wing of the APRA party. In his book 
entitled The Forgotten Proposal (1988), Vasquez Bazan had been critical of 
the government’s economic policies, deeming them as a repetition of the tra- 
ditional Latin  American  populist paradigm and at odds with APRA’s tradi- 
tional  structural  reform  agenda.  Notwithstanding  this  criticism,  economic 
policy during the following  12 months engaged in an erratic sequence of  ad 
hoc  measures driven by  short-run developments.  In general, measures fol- 
lowed a “zig-zag” pattern, with later measures running in opposite direction 
to earlier ones in an attempt to correct their destabilizing effects. The initial 
new policies included, inter alia, introduction of a crawling peg (at a contin- 
uously fine-tuned rate), monthly wage increases, sporadic public price adjust- 
ments, and a few exotic tax measures, including a new tax on the turnover of 
checks (tables 9.15 and 9.16). Since July  1989, the Central Bank started to 
accommodate again government credit requests (tables 9.5 and 9.14). On the 
other hand, an increasing number of  categories of imports were made eligible 
for foreign exchange at the highly subsidized official exchange rate. By De- 
cember 1989, 72 percent  of  total  imports  were given access to the  official 
market. The policy goal was to prompt a quick recovery by boosting import 
levels. 
The free market exchange rate, however, very soon reflected expansionary 
financial policies.  By the end of the year the spread over the official rate had 
surpassed 100 percent. At this point, the authorities switched into a contain- 
ment effort  aimed at avoiding a further explosion of the exchange rate and 
prices before the forthcoming presidential elections of 8 April 1990.17  As part 
of this strategy, the Central Bank started to provide dollar loans to exporters 
and to sell term promissory dollar notes to importers in an attempt to depress 
the free market exchange rate.  The Central Bank’s financing of  the govern- 
ment’s deficit in 1989 was small, about 4.3 percent of GDP-most  of it during 
the second half of the year (table 9.8). But, as often happens with high infla- 
tion processes,  the pressure of just a little Central Bank financing on a tiny 
financial system  was enough to sustain hyperinflation.  Thus, the year  1989 
ended with an inflation  rate of 2,800 percent (after having peaked  at nearly 
6,000 percent during the 12 months ending in August 1989). Moreover, GDP 
dropped by  10 percent,  adding to the 9 percent decline in  1988, and interna- 
tional reserves started to destock at a fast pace beginning in November  1989. 
17. As explained in the publication Peru Economico of  December 1989 (Apoyo 1989) Table 9.14  Monthly Economic Indicators,  1985-90 
Central Bank  Central Bank Net 
Broad  Domestic Credit  International 
Money  (Nominal Growth  Reserves 
(Nominal  Ratep  (in Millions 
Real GDP  Inflation  Employment  Real Wage  Hours Lost  Growth  of  U.S. 






















































































































































































































































































101.  I 
Real Wage 





























-  65.7 
-85.4 
-74.4 






-  22.7 
-46.2 
-  82.0 
16.  I 
79.5 




-  29.6 






















































4.8  4.8 
9.4  9.4 
10.6  10.6 
10.4  10.4 
7.3  7.3 
8.6  8.6 
20.6  20.6 
~  ~~ 























-  50 
-  153 
-  194 
-  237 
-219 
-  180 









































































































































86.  I 
125.1 
N.A. 
15.6  18.4 
22.7  101.4 
19.5  7.4 
15.4  58.2 
38.6  19.6 
17.8  24.8 
31.3  30.5 
37.9  22.4 
33.7  26.9 
41.6  9.3 
27.9  14.4 
40.8  32.3 
26.5  15.0 
30.7  16.8 
32.  I  19.9 
28.3  14.8 
23.3  24.4 
13.5  27.3 
17.6  29.0 
27.8  57.2 
22.2  25.9 
31.8  38.8 
44.0  55.6 
18.4  -  266 
~  34.0  -  293 
7.4  -317 
-  13.2  -  304 
19.6  -  352 
-5.5  -319 
4.2  -  323 
-  .7  -213 
-6.5  -  45 
1.2  79 
3.3  176 
21 .o  222 
8.8  373 
13.6  450 
19.0  457 
14.1  453 
22.3  357 
22.4  30 I 
19.7  131 
38.8  -  37 
7.0  -119 
17.4  -  152 
29.0  -  143 
~  ~ 
"Percentage increase over previous month 
bPercent  increase over same month of  previous year 
'Excludes deposits denominated in dollars 
dCentral  Bank Credit netted out of losses ansing from valuation adjustments due to exchange rate devaluation Table 9.15  Packages of Economic Measures, January-June  1989 
January  February  March  April  May  June 
PRICES, WAGES, AND  +  Tablira: preanounce- 
EXCHANGE RATE 
Eftective rate (devaluation) 





Minimum wage increases 
Public-sector wage in- 
Private-sector wage in- 







Increase of price of  con- 
trolled products (%) 


















ment for next four 
months of official 
exchange rate, 
gasoline price, and 
minimum wage 
10  26  45 
1  I  1 
2  2  2 
3  3  3 
24  31  26 
15  35  24 
21  21  25 
29  28  44 
25  30  27 
35  34  20 
42  28  26 
New taxes 
Reduction of  ‘46 of  im- 
STRICTIONS  ports eligible to the 
official market 
(from 65% to 5010) 
IMPORT TARIFFS AND RE- 
Evolution of quantitative re- 
strictions (QRs) (% of to- 
tal of tariff categories) 
Free from QRs 
License required 
Import prohibitions 
Evolution of tariffs 
Average tariff 
Maximum tariff 








Lending rate (Ir) 
Deposit rate (9) 
25 per month 






33  2 
I  I 
2  2 
3  3 
40  29 
30  38 
30  25 
0  0 
0  0 
4  in 
19  7 
7.  I 
82.7 
10.2 
i CLDa  +CLD4 
trom 30%  trom 40% 
to 40%  50% 
‘The Certificados de Libre Disponibilidad (CLD) is a tradable dollar certificate given to exporters for a 
share of  their export proceeds that can be used by an importer. Table 9.16  Packages of Economic Measures, July-December  1989 
July  August  September  October  November  December 
PRICES, WAGES, AND 
EXCHANGE RATE 
Effective rate (devaluation) (%) 




Minimum wage increases (76) 
Public-sector wage increases (%) 
Private-sector wage increases (70) 




Increase of price of controlled 
products (%) 
Changes in existing taxes 
New taxes 
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+Tax of  1% on check- 







+ 2.5% of September 
sales for Social Com- 













+Reduction of excise 
taxes 
51  I0 
I  I 
2  3 
3  4 
22  31 
24  28 
22  25 
6  18 
0  42 
51  4 
21  21 
t 1 % of imports and 2% 
of traditional exports 
for National Defense 
Fund 
t  Increase of  % of  +Further increase of '% 
of imports eligible for 
the official exchange 
market (from 69% to 
imports eligible for 
the official exchange 
market (from 50% 
to 69%)  12%) 
(continued) Table 9.16  (continued) 
July  August  September  October  November  December 
Evolution of quantitative restric- 
tions (QRs) (% of total 
of tariff categories) 
Free from QRs  19.6 
License required  10.2 
Import prohibitions  10.2 
Evolution of tariffs 
Average tariff  66 
Maximum tariff  110 
EXPORTS MEASURES  +  CLD" from 50% to  +  CLDa  from S5% to  +  CLDa from 45% to  +  Nontraditional 
SS%  45% but 10% in cash  35% but 20% in cash  exporters receive 
(U.S.$)  (U.S.$)  advance accounts 
(FENT) in U.S.$ 
INTEREST RATE 
Lending rate (96)  23.5 per month  21.5 per month 
Deposit rate (%)  19.0 per month 
"he  Certificados de Libre Disponibilidad (CLD) is a tradable dollar certificate given to exporters for a share of  their export proceeds that can be used by  an importer. Table 9.17  Packages of Economic Measures, January-June  1990 
January  February  March  April 
~ 
June 
PRICES.  WAGES, AND 
EXCHANGE RATE 
Effective rate (devaluation) (70) 




Minimum wage increases (8) 
Public sector wage increases (%) 
Private sector wage increases (%I 






Increase of  price of controlled product, 
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2% 
+Tax on loans 














(continued) Table 9.17  (continued) 
January  February  March  April  May  Junc 
IMPORT TARIFFS AND  +  Reduction of lo of  + Further decrease of lo of  +Additional decrease of  % 
RESTRICTIONS  imports eligible to  imports eligible for the  of imports eligible for the 
the official  official exchange market  official exchange market 
exchange market  (from 67% to  61%)  (from 61% to 43%) 
(from 728 
to 67%) 
Evolution of quantitative 
restrictions (QRs) (B  of 
total of tariff categories) 
Free from QRs 
License required 
Import prohibitions 
Total number of tariffs 
categories 
Evolution of  tariffs: 
Average tariff 
Maximum tariff 
EXPORTS MEASURES  + CLD” from 35% to 45%  + CLDa from 45% to 35%  +Advance accounts to 
but 10% in cash  exporters in intis 
+Elimination ot advance 
accounts in U.S. dollars 
INTEREST RATE 
Lending rate  23.08  per month 
Deposit rate  21.0%  per month 
29.0% per month 




39.0% per month 
32.0% per month 
‘The Certificados de Libre Disponibilidad  (CLD) is a tradable dollar certificate given to exporters for a share of their export proceeds that can be used by an importer. 311  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
In  December  1989, following  a warning  by  the IMF that  it would initiate 
procedures that could ultimately lead to Peru’s expulsion from the institution, 
the  government  resumed  payments  of  current  debt  service to  the  IMF- 
thereby freezing arrears with this institution at the level of September 1989. 
The authorities came to terms with the institution against which they had been 
most vociferously confrontational, while continuing the default with the rest 
of the creditors. 
The containment effort continued during the first half of  1990. But, as in- 
ternational reserves evaporated, imports were progressively transferred back 
from the official market to the free foreign exchange market and dollars sup- 
plied by the Central Bank for other transactions started to be tightly rationed. 
Hence, the burden of “controlling” the free exchange rate was now placed on 
monetary policy. Credit to the private sector was dried up, through increased 
reserve requirements on deposits. In parallel, the Treasury stretched payments 
of expenditures and incurred more domestic arrears rather than resort to price 
and tariff hikes and/or larger Central Bank financing. In this context, effective 
lending interest rates to the private sector reached  15-plus percent per month 
in real terms. To limit the pace of reserve depletion the authorities took the 
unprecedented step of going into a de fact0 default on ALADI (Latin Ameri- 
can Trade Area), clearing payments owed to other Latin American Central 
Banks and requesting rescheduling of settlements so that the payments would 
fall due under the next presidential  term.  In  spite of these efforts, reserves 
continued to decline-by  June  1990, reported  gross reserves totaled barely 
$600 million (most of them nonliquid),  1 billion less than in August  1989. 
After  12 consecutive months with an inflation rate of  around 30 percent per 
month, inflation picked up again in June 1990, reaching 43 percent. In paral- 
lel, the free exchange rate took off  in late June at spreads of 200 percent over 
the official rate. By late July, inflation was running at 6 percent per day. 
To  compound  these  formidable  problems,  that  were  handed  over  to 
president-elect Albert0 Fujimori on 28 July 1990, a number of other obstacles 
to economic management during the next presidential term were established 
by the outgoing administration. Among them are a policy of  active employ- 
ment in public-sector entities launched in January 1990 and the issuance of a 
number of laws that will complicate some of the structural reforms that the 
next government may wish  to embark upon.  One of these laws affects the 
transfer of several key public enterprises to local governments, thereby pre- 
venting the central government from effective control over them. 
9.4  Summing Up the Experience 
Beyond its macroeconomic debacle, the policies of  1985-90  had devastat- 
ing effects on income distribution, agricultural incomes, the financial system, 
the tax system, the financial viability of  public enterprises, resource alloca- 
tion, public infrastructure, and the health and nutrition of the poor. For a gov- 312  Ricardo Lago 
ernment whose main objectives were to expand the role of  the state in the 
economy and to benefit the poor, the ultimate paradoxes were twofold. On the 
one hand, hyperinflation forced an  ex post shrinkage of the size of  the govern- 
ment by  more than half-as  gauged by  the share of  public expenditures on 
GDP-even  though public-sector employment increased 30 percent. And, on 
the other hand, the poor ended up being hurt the most. 
The government’s attempts to protect wages notwithstanding, average real 
wages declined by  a cumulative 60 percent in 1987-89,  about three times the 
20 percent output loss experienced in  the period  (fig. 9.1 and table 9.14). 
Peruvian workers and organized labor-in  particular the left-wing CGTP, Pe- 
ru’s largest union-showed  a considerable degree of pragmatism and restraint 
in accepting phenomenal real wage cuts in the form of imperfect wage index- 
ation formulas,  apparently in exchange for much less drastic reductions in 
employment levels. The reported cumulative decline of employment in 1987- 
89 was about 10 percent. By early 1990, however, 8 percent of the labor force 
was reported unemployed and 74 percent underemployed.  I8 
Income distribution definitely worsened. As shown in table 9.18, the in- 
come shares of working-class recipients, after having experienced significant 
improvements in 1986-87  at the tie of the boom, went back in 1988 to levels 
lower than those of  1985. The Gini coefficient in 1988 had regressed to that of 
1985. Moreover, as fig. 9.1 shows, the formidable widening of the gap be- 
tween the paths of real GDP and real wages occurred after the fourth quarter 
of  1988, which indicates that probably the income shares of civil servants and 
nonagricultural workers must have deteriorated further in  1989. Likewise, as 
figure 9.12 shows, the rural-urban terms of trade plunged starting in 1988- 
in the wake of the fast real appreciation of the exchange rate and the impossi- 
bility of  maintaining the subsidy levels of  1986-1987-leading  to a decline 
in the share of agricultural incomes in GNP from 12.1 percent in  1986 to 9.3 
percent in  1988. A probable further decline occurred in 1989 in view of the 
continued drop of  the terms of trade. (At this writing, data on income distri- 
bution for 1989 was not available.) 
On  the  other  hand,  most  subsidies provided  through  low  public-sector 
prices and tariffs-by  June 1990, most of these were at 30 percent or less of 
their levels, in real terms, of July  1985 (table 9.19)-tended  to benefit rela- 
tively more the less poor, the urban, and the rich consumers. The regressive- 
ness of most of these subsidies is illustrated in table 9.20, in which it can be 
noted that Peru’s 30 percent poorest barely purchase gasoline, electricity, and 
water or use telephone and transport, and, to the extent that they purchase or 
use these, they consume relatively less than the less poor consumers. Paradox- 
ically, the price of  rice, the poor’s main staple, rose by  far more than,  say, 
gasoline, despite the clear progressiveness of the rice subsidy and the regres- 
siveness of  the gasoline subsidy. All this indicates that the deterioration in 
18. See n. 4 above for the definition of  underemployment 313  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
Table 9.18  Income (at Factor Cost) Distribution by  Groups of Recipients 
Income Groups 
Percentage of  Income  Percentage of Recipients 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Agricultural workers  10.8  12.1  10.9  9.3  36.3  35.5  35.0  35.2 
Nonagricultural self-employed  15.7  17.9  16.7  19.7  23.2  23.3  23.2  23.8 
Nonagricultural workers  21.3  22.8  22.3  19.5  26.0  26.3  26.3  25.1 
Civil servants  11.0  11.8  12.4  7.2  11.6  12.0  12.0  13.0 
Employers  41.2  35.5  31.7  44.3  2.8  2.9  2.9  2.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Gini coefficient  0.50  0.41  0.43  0.50  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . 
Source: National Statistical Institute 
50 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Year 
Fig. 9.12  Rural-urban terms of trade, 1985-89  (1985 = 100) 
income redistribution,  as portrayed in  table 9.18, probably understates the 
real magnitude of  the problem. Indeed, subsidies via prices and tariffs seem 
to have worsened distribution even further. 
Lagging  public-sector  prices-a  permanent  key  feature of  the  govern- 
ment’s strategy to fight “cost-push diagnosed” inflation-resulted  in a fall of 
public enterprises’ revenues from 26  percent of GDP in  1985 to 7 percent in 
1989, and to a corresponding decline in investment expenditures from 6 per- 
cent of  GDP to 2 percent (table 9.8). In parallel, the policy of  discretionary 
tax exemptions together with collection lags-of  three months on average- 
and imperfect indexation of  the tax  base gave rise to a caricaturized Tanzi 314  Ricardo Lago 
Table 9.19  Relative Prices of Selected Goods and Services Provided by  Public 
Enterprises (July 1985= 100) 
Average  June 

























































Source: Ministry of  Finance and author’s estimates. 
Table 9.20  Budget Shares of Selected Items (%) 
Poorest 30% 
Poorest  Rest 
Item  10%  All  Urban  70%  All Peru 
Fuel and oil for vehicles 
(% who purchase) 
Kerosene 
Electricity 
(% who purchase) 
Water service 
(% who purchase) 
Telephone 


































































Source  Glewwe (1988), drawing on data from Peru’s 1985-86  “Living Standard Measurement 
Survey,” carned out by Peru’s National Statistical Institute and the World Bank 
effect (fig. 9.13). In 1989, tax revenues barely totaled 5 percent of GDP, down 
from 15 percent in 1985, just sufficient to cover the public sector’s payroll. In 
total, combined gross revenues of  the consolidated public sector dropped to 
one-third of the 1985 level. Inadequate expenditures on investment and main- 
tenance of  infrastructure, together with the drought of  1989 and terrorist at- 
tacks on electrical networks (in 1988 the number of  electrical facilities dam- 










1980  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Quarter 
Tax  Revenues  Total Expenditures  - 
Fig. 9.13 
(real index 1985-11 = 100) 
Central government: Taxes and expenditures 
shortages and acute water scarcity a daily event in Lima and other cities. Pri- 
vate electricity-generating systems became one of the fastest growing lines of 
business. 
Even theoretically, it is difficult to quantify output and welfare losses result- 
ing from price distortions. Indeed, it is even difficult to measure price distor- 
tions, more so in a hyperinflationary setting. Nonetheless, two illustrations of 
the problem can be provided. The first is price volatility, and the second con- 
sists of deviations from border pricing. Price volatility rises with the level of 
inflation, thus blurring the genuine informative content of prices and increas- 
ing information and transaction costs. All this leads to resource misallocation, 
uncertainty, and low investment levels. Table 9.21 provides information on 
price dispersion derived from the inflation indices of  the eight broad cate- 
gories of consumption “carried’ in the CPI basket. The coefficient of variation 
of  contemporaneous monthly inflation indices jumped fourfold from 1985 to 
1989. 
A second illustration of  distorted price signals is provided by  the “poten- 
tial” deviations of domestic relative prices from border prices resulting from 
the tariff code, multiple exchange rates and quantitative restrictions. Table 
9.22 presents the combined effects on nominal protection of the tariff structure 
and multiple exchange rates alone at two points in late 1987. it can be noticed 
that the relative price between a highly protected good and a highly unpro- 
tected good could potentially rise as high as nine times over the corresponding 
international relative price. It is also remarkable that in only two months both 
the levels of protection and the dispersion of protection rates increased signif- 316  Ricardo Lago 
Table 9.21  Price Dispersion’ 
Maximum  Minimum 
increasec  Increasec  Intervald 
Year  Dispersionb  (%b)  i%)  i%) 
1984  89.8  134.7  103.5  31.2 
1985  100.0  214.3  137.8  76.5 
1986  114.1  113.2  33.7  79.5 
1987  139.2  177.9  66.6  111.3 
1988  290.2  2,454.2  1,231.3  1,222.9 
1989  426.9  10,017.9  1,632.9  8,385.3 
Source: Apoyo (1990). 
Trice indices of eight broad categories of  the CPI. 
bAs  measured by the ratio of  the standard deviation to the mean of monthly inflation rates of  eight 
categories. Index number (1985 = 100) reported is the average of  12 months of  the year. 
<Of  annual inflation rate for each category of  goods. 
dDerived from (maximum increase) -  (minimum increase). 
Table 9.22  Combined Nominal hotection from Tariffs and  Multiple Exchange Rate 
(Unweighted Rates in %) 
Exchange Rate as of  10/26/87  Exchange Rate as of  12/21/87 
Minimum  Maximum  Mean  SD  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  SD 
The whole economy  -  35.3  237.4  95.5  56.6  -57.4  300.7  99.4  72.6 
Agriculture  -  35.3  187.0  79.9  55.5  -57.4  240.9  79.6  70.6 
Mining  12.0  114.2  76.3  28.4  -26.0  154.4  51.9  28.3 
Manufacturing  -  19.2  237.4  96.6  56.8  -41.2  300.7  101.2  72.8 
Consumer goods  -  19.2  237.4  141.3  58.3  -46.6  300.7  166.3  79.0 
Intermediate im- 
-  19.2  189.8  75.5  44.5  -44.4  244.2  56.6  43.2 
Capital goods  .8  189.8  90.5  51.2  -47.2  244.2  108.7  57.7 
Sources: Calculated by Lachler (1989) at the eight-digit tariff code level. Arancel Integrado de Aduanas 
del Peru 1987 and Diario Oficial “El Peruano,” 10/26/87  and 12/21/87. 
ports 
icantly (the maximum rate rose from 237 to 301 percent, while the standard 
deviation went from 57 to 73). 
The formal financial system shrunk to less than one-quarter of  its size in 
1985. Indeed, while in 1985 total financial-sector internal liabilities amounted 
to 21 percent of GDP, by  mid-1990 they barely represented 5 percent. About 
two-thirds of  total credit was either utilized by the public sector or redirected 
to public development banks to be on loan to the private sector. 
Economists hide behind what common people view as abstract magnitudes 
(GDP, inflation, etc.). These magnitudes are in general subject to considerable 
measurement error. However, the real ultimate effects of  economic decline 
and more regressive income redistribution are best assessed by “impact,” more 317  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
precise variables such  as  infant mortality. The destruction of  the  revenue 
base-and  thus of the expenditure capability-of  the government led to a 
decline in public social expenditures from $40 per capita in  1981 to $14 in 
1989.  Declining  social  expenditures  and  falling  real  wages  provoked  a 
marked deterioration of health and nutrition indicators, particularly among the 
poor.  Comparable surveys undertaken by  PRISMA, a Peruvian NGO,  in  a 
pen-urban Lima settlement, show that infant mortality for children five years 
old or younger increased 50 percent between 1987 and 1989, while the index 
of adequacy to the norm of  weight and height of children under three years 
old worsened substantially.  l9 
9.5  Concluding Remarks 
Peru’s economic policy between 1985-90  fits all the elements of the Dom- 
busch and Edwards (1990) paradigm: a stagnant economy with highly skewed 
income distribution and consistently unfulfilled expectations. The latter had 
been particularly frustrated with the failure of  the sweeping social reforms 
attempted by  military dictator Juan Velasco Alvarado in  1968-75,  who had 
hoped to integrate this fragmented country. 
The policy goals of the 1985-90  experiment were indeed reactivation and 
improvement of  incomes of workers and peasants by  use of macroeconomic 
policy. It was, however, believed-or  at least the official rhetoric stated-that 
the improvement of  real wages would not have to come necessarily at the 
expense of  lower profit margins.  Slack capacity and abundant foreign ex- 
change reserves could allow everybody’s income to expand. Moreover, the 
profits of firms in the “reactivation” phase were thought to provide the govern- 
ment with a good bargaining tool to use in negotiating private firms’ reinvest- 
ment in exporting sectors during the subsequent “restructuring” phase. It was 
the dispute over private investment that seems to have prompted the initiative 
to nationalize banks and insurance companies and embark on a left-leaning 
agenda. 
The nationalization of  the banking system was the only social “reformist” 
step attempted by  the government. The reality of the nationalization is, how- 
ever, that it was de facto never implemented. It was contested in the courts 
and actively resisted by  mass mobilization. When the law was finally issued 
by Congress in October 1987-three  months after the presidential initiative- 
it permitted 51 percent employee-owned banks to remain nonpublic and of- 
fered banks the possibility of becoming private regional banks. The owners of 
Peru’s largest private bank, Banco de Credito, rushed to block sell 51 percent 
of its shares to workers, with financing provided by a subsidiary of the same 
bank. As for the remaining banks, the process ended up in a precarious legal 
19. Surveys undertaken in Pampas de San Juan by the Grupode Trabajo A.B.  PRISMNUPCH. 
Report presented to UNICEF, September 1989. 318  Ricardo Lago 
status: banks were de facto allowed to continue in private hands but the Na- 
tionalization Law was not repealed. 
The phases of the experiment match closely those described by Dornbusch 
and  Edwards (1990). The expansionary phase was as spectacular-and  in- 
deed the government was fully vindicated even by big business-as  the reces- 
sionary phase which  ended in hyperinflation  was formidable. Two striking 
features of Peru’s hyperinflation were the rapid deindexation and real decline 
of wages and the independent course pursued by the Central Bank during 10 
months in the middle of the process. These two factors reversed the explosive 
hyperinflationary  trend and helped accumulate sizable international reserves. 
Two central lessons can be learned from Peru’s experience. First, the devastat- 
ing decline in real wages and agricultural incomes shows that populist exper- 
iments end up hurting most those whom they are intended to benefit. Second, 
clear rules of  the game embodied in the laws, like charters that provide for an 
independent Central Bank, are a desirable commodity even in countries where 
laws are loosely enforced, as is the case in many developing nations. Some- 
body might come and use the laws! 
Of the major Latin American debtors, Peru was the first one to embark on a 
broad-scale  unilateral  default. Unlike  the cases of the other debtors, Peru’s 
default was deliberately confrontational beginning in  1985 and was later ex- 
tended to the multilateral  credit institutions.  Although assessing costs of de- 
fault is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it here to say that they were 
significant in terms of paralyzed development projects, reluctant new foreign 
investments,  increased  trade  restrictions  abroad,  reduced  aid  flows,  and, 
above all, a major macroeconomic failure. By early 1990, about 70 percent of 
Peru’s $20 billion external debt was in arrears, and Peruvian commercial debt 
traded at 7@  on the dollar in the secondary market. The ultimate debacle of the 
economic policies has been  viewed  by  some as the example to prove  that 
foreign debt is not the problem of Latin American countries, yet others have 
claimed that a debt overhang acts as a tax on the debtor country’s predisposi- 
tion to embark on sound policies (Sachs 1987). Peru’s experience, however, 
appears to prove both, often presented  as conflicting, theories: a debt over- 
hang does not reward good performance and yet the burden of the debt is just 
only one of the many problems faced by Latin American countries. 
Theoreticians of  the now-fashionable  topic of the economics of populism 
struggle to set forth theories attempting to explain why politicians engage in 
such adventurous experiments and why populist episodes have been a recur- 
rent them in many Latin American countries. Several hypothesis put forward 
recently can be analyzed in light of Peru’s recent experience. 
The first hypothesis is that of a high discount rate. The policymaker prefers 
an early high payoff-at  the cost of  a later decline-to  a steady path of  im- 
provement in incomes. Under this hypothesis, the policymaker is viewed as a 
rational agent, aware of the key interrelations and constraints among the eco- 319  Peru’s Heterodox Experience 
nomic variables,  who tries to maximize an intertemporal income stream at a 
high discount rate. To  assess the relevance of  this hypothesis in the Peruvian 
case the following simple exercise was performed: a comparison between the 
present value of the actual monthly real wage index for the period July  1985 
to June  1990 (actual  scenario)  and the monthly real wage index that would 
have resulted  from a sustained annual  real  growth of  2 percent  (alternative 
scenario).20  It can be seen in figures 9.14 and 9.15 that the actual scenario is 
preferable to the alternative one at annual real discount rates higher than  19 
percent.  This line of reasoning, however, does not explain why high rates of 
discount are indeed high. Political and social dimensions need to be consid- 
ered to provide an explanation. Among these, Kaufman and Stallings (in this 
volume) have emphasized several factors that appear to shorten policy mak- 
ers’ time horizons. These include (1) political and social instability that may 
render the tenure of office insecure and (2) the arrival to power of parties after 
long periods of political exclusion. Both factors clearly apply to the Peruvian 
case. Moreover, Kaufman and Stallings also argue that in politically unstable 
societies it is more difficult for the people to assign responsibilities,  and that 
politicians themselves might use this circumstance to put the blame for eco- 
nomic  failures on “exogenous forces.”  In  April  1990 President  Garcia  de- 
clared that terrorism was responsible for hyperinflation. 
The second hypothesis is “bad economics”: policymakers do not know the 
real  constraints  imposed  by  macroeconomic variables  and  behavioral  rela- 
tions,  and they act accordingly. Ample evidence was provided in this paper 
(section 9.3.2) of the departure from received mainstream economics of most 
economic beliefs  of  the team that  designed the  1985 heterodox  program. 
However,  it is, in principle, difficult to know whether those theories are an 
exotic tailored rationalization  of a set of inconsistent policy objectives estab- 
lished “a priori” by politicians or if they are indeed genuine guiding theories. 
In the  case under analysis, it  appears that  the dominant  line of  thought  in 
policy-making was misled most of the time, but this seems to have been over- 
shadowed by the prevalence of  a firm political agenda. In fact, once the crisis 
had already unraveled, the corrective attempts proposed by Coronado and Sal- 
inas were frustrated by political constraints. 
The third hypothesis, proposed by Drake (1982), is that populism starts as 
a calculated effort to gain political support and momentum but subsequently 
fails to switch into orthodoxy at the right time. In this case, populism would 
be a combination of  a high discount rate and bad economics. This explana- 
tion, however, raises the questions of  why most if not all populist experiments 
end in macroeconomic disaster and why there is a failure to learn from previ- 
ous similar experiences. 
20. We  are aware of  the limitations of this exercise. Among others, real wages might not he the 
only variable to he maximized, and the planning horizon might go beyond the five-year presiden- 
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The fourth explanation is that populism is a deliberate attempt to favor the 
interests of  specific groups at the expense of other sectors. However, as noted 
above,  the  intended  beneficiaries  (i.e.,  workers  and poor farmers) end up 
being major losers. Again, perhaps this comes as a consequence of a combi- 
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Sachs (1989) has established a formal dynamic framework aimed at ex- 
plaining recurrent stop-and-go economic cycles in Latin American countries. 
He argues that secularly skewed income distribution and pressure from pow- 
erful urban lobbies, represented by inward-looking businesses and urban labor 
unions, are two key elements that prompt politicians to engage in an expan- 
sionary cycle at the end of  a yet-not-totally-completed previous stabilization 
phase. Expansionary cycles seek to benefit urban groups at the expense of the 
incomes of resource-based exporting groups. The model fits Peru’s character- 
istics well: (i) income distribution is worse than the average for Latin America 
(the ratio between the income shares of  the top and poorest quintiles is 25 
compared to an average of 21 for the region) and (ii) the development model 
followed since the sixties is perhaps the most inward-looking of the region (in 
1989 Peru was still the Latin American country with the highest average and 
maximum tariff rates,  as well as the one with the largest share of  imports 
under licenses).  In  a  sense, however,  recurrent economic policies can be 
viewed as a particular case of the more general theme portrayed by  modem 
Latin American novel writers. In his masterpiece One Hundred Years ofSoli- 
rude, Gabriel Garcia Marquez depicts a world in which the cast of characters 
changes, but everything else remains the same. History repeats itself over and 
over again. Therefore, the absence of  an  effective “learning process” from 
previous economic failures probably has cultural and other roots deeper than 
those purely economical or political. 
Finally, a note on reactivation programs. At a time when the old Keynesian 
paradigm is being reincarnated into new fashionable and rigorous theories of 
“multiple real equilibria,” the issue of the viability of recovery programs for 
severely depressed economies needs to be given consideration. The question 
is whether it is possible for an economy, which has undergone an unbalanced 
previous stabilization, to  successfully run  a demand-led experiment for a 
while and, from then on, return to orthodoxy. In other words, if during stabi- 
lization there was  “excessive” hoarding of international reserves reached at 
the expense of overadjustment of real wages and depressed domestic real de- 
mand, it is possible for a “credible” incoming government to return real wages 
and GDP to more normal levels and then to switch into an orthodox approach? 
It is conceivable that this may be possible at least in theory. The economics 
and politics of Peru in  1985 were particularly prone for such an experiment. 
But the easy part is the recovery, the difficult part is maintaining macroeco- 
nomic stability and resuming sustainable growth. More specifically, the diffi- 
cult issue is to find consistency between the policies implemented for the re- 
covery and  the policies needed for stability and growth. The designers of 
Peru’s program were certain that the limits of the recovery were set by  inter- 
national reserves and slack capacity, but they were not aware that the strategy 
followed to  prompt the recovery-subsidies,  controls, and  import restric- 
tions-were  the antithesis of the incentive environment required to move the 
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Moreover,  ideology  aside, economic programs  that  rely  heavily  on  naive 
“multiplier-accelerator”  Keynesian models and price controls and, at the same 
time, disregard the inevitable restrictions imposed by budget constraints ulti- 
mately lead to macroeconomic collapse. While it is often argued that there is 
no agreement within the profession on economic theories-an  argument often 
put  forth by  the designers of  populist  programs-disagreement  on flow of 
funds accounting is nothing  less than  “bad economics.”  And  populist  pro- 
grams end with macroeconomic failure because of their disregard for account- 
ing constraints. 
A country’s economy is a complex system. Belief in virtuous-cycle policy 
interventions  to improve the dynamics of  complex systems is a dangerous 
strategy. Jay Forrester’s ( 1972) two basic principles on the “counterintuitive 
behavior of complex systems” need to be borne in mind. The first is that com- 
plex systems have a few sensitive points of  entry at which a small effort can 
yield a significantly larger return. The second is that a complex system tends 
to draw our attention to the very points at which an attempt to intervene will 
fail. It is far too simple to believe that the intricacies of “multiple real equilib- 
ria” could be exploited with price controls and public deficit financing. 
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Comment  Javier Iguifiiz-Echeverria 
The title of Ricardo Lago’s paper is misleading. It would seem to suggest that, 
in general, pursuing redistribution through macropolicy is an illusion. In that 
respect, I would like to say, first of all, that redistribution is a common feature 
of macropolicy, not an illusion. We  all know, for instance, that exchange rate 
policies or,  more precisely, real devaluation, a key  element of  almost any 
macropolicy, has fairly systematic regressive redistributive effects. 
After reading the paper, a second possible meaning of the title came to my 
mind. Lago’s main thesis seems to be that government attempts to prevent 
regressive income redistribution by,  for instance, raising wages by  the same 
amount as other price increments, are self-defeating. Its main policy conclu- 
sion appears to be that the best way to protect wage earners during an adjust- 
ment  process is to increase wages by  amounts less than exchange rate and 
public price increments. Actually, I think this is a well-known method for 
reducing aggregate demand while trying to establish a new structure of rela- 
tive prices and income distribution. Before going into a more detailed analysis 
of the arguments supporting this thesis in the case of Peru, however, I would 
like to comment on some less technical and more historical matters in order to 
improve, I hope, descriptions of recent Peruvian experience. 
I particularly feel that Lago’s paper builds a stylized image of Garcia’s gov- 
ernment that  fits a well-structured and coherent “economic villain” model. 
Garcia-or  heterodoxy-is  the obvious enemy, while on the other side of the 
(theoretical) coin are the friends or “heroes” at the Central Bank (Webb and 
Coronado) waving the flag of  the monetary approach to the balance of  pay- 
ments. The main problem with this view is that Garcia has been, above all, a 
noneconomic man with no economic program and with no stable class or so- 
cial allegiances. He was  at first antilabor, because organized workers were 
“the privileged,” and also anti-industry, because this activity was imitative of 
Western production  and  consumption patterns  and  geographically concen- 
trated in the capital city. Austerity at the top 25% of  the income pyramid and 
reactivation from below (peasants as producers and shanty-town dwellers as 
direct consumers) were his stated goals, given that he considered himself the 
president of  the lower 75%. The key issues were food and decentralization. 
This was his first redistributive program. Accordingly, he explicitly rejected 
any reactivation plan based on the growth of the modem sector of the country. 
At that time, Garcia stressed the need to undergo sacrifices. This period coin- 
cided with the application of  a variant of the Austral Plan that was incorpo- 
rated into Garcia’s economic policy options a few days before he  assumed 
office, and was influenced by  the enormous popularity of  Alfonsin in Argen- 
tina. 
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From  this  mix  of  physiocratic  polpotianism  and practical  short-run  neo- 
structuralist  and truly  heterodox  view  of  reactivation,  he  was  transformed 
(after a summer inflationary fever due to difficulties in the food area) into a 
proponent of urban consumption-led  growth, modem agriculture,  easy food 
importation,  and easier import subsidies.  His first redistributive  project was 
discarded, heterodoxy  was also abandoned and an old-fashioned Keynesian 
demand-led program was put in place. This second model is the one exten- 
sively  considered  by  Lago in  his paper.  Mentioning  the original project in 
spite of  its short life span is meant to recall that Garcia was never a prolabor 
politician, and that, therefore, once the recession started, his adjustment mea- 
sures were antilabor ex ante, from the beginning.  This viewpoint appears to 
run against Lago’s thesis about the ex ante attempt to avoid the redistributive 
effects of adjustment measures. Let me examine this aspect of Garcia’s suc- 
cessive stabilization attempts. 
According  to table  9.9,  for  instance,  Lago suggests  that  the  economic 
“packages” attempted to keep the eamingdwages (e/w) ratio more or less con- 
stant. That is not right. In October 1987, measures of the increases in public- 
sector wages (25%)  and private-sector wages (25%)  appear more or less equal 
to the effective devaluation rate (29%); something similar can be found in the 
case of the March, September, and November  1988 measures. This informa- 
tion, however, is in fact misleading, because in practically all cases there were 
upper limits to the wage hikes that made the ex ante effective increase in those 
wages smaller than the devaluation rate. The important rise of the e/w ratio is 
not, as Lago suggests, an ex post result of the attempt to do otherwise; there 
was a conscious  and very successful redistributive attempt.  For instance, in 
the October 1987 measures, the 25% increase in private-sector wages applied, 
according to Decree 016-87-TR, only to those that were receiving at that time 
an income of 3,200 intis or less. The rest received  less than that percentage 
since the maximum increment allowed was 800 intis. Moreover, the increment 
was due to become effective only in November. Something similar happened 
with the public-sector wages. The raise in wages was granted in July and there 
was an absolute limit imposed that month by Decree 077-87-PCM. Moreover, 
the 25% raise applied only to the “basic” income, which is smaller than the 
“net” or total “liquid” income to which workers are entitled. In October, the 
only raise in wages was 10% received by public blue-collar workers. It is true 
that the minimum  legal  wage rose from  1,710 to 2,200 intis, but the other 
wages were increased by less than the devaluation  rate.  In the March  1988 
measures, the 45% increase in private-sector wages applied to wages of up to 
5,000 intis per month, while the rest received a raise of only 2,250 intis. The 
40% increase applied to public-sector wages also had a limit. The same type 
of  rule was applied in the November measures. The rule has therefore been, 
to raise those wages at the bottom  more and to set absolute ceilings to the 
increment.  As we know, more or less three-fourths of  the mass of  wages is 
received by the upper one-quarter of wage earners. On the other hand, around 326  Ricardo Lago 
20% of the labor force received the minimum wage. In June 1988 there was a 
devaluation of the inti, and in July there was a raise in wages. These measures 
do not appear in Lago’s table. This time the nominal increase in private-sector 
wages, established by Decree 021-88-EE was 60% and was applied to those 
wages up to 6,000 intis per  month.  Those with larger salaries received  an 
increment of only 3,600 intis.  In the case of  the public sector the raise was 
51% of the “basic” income of those workers that had an effective wage of  up 
to 20,000 intis. Those with wages between 20,001 and 25,000 intis received 
40%,  and smaller percentages  were applied to higher wages.  In September 
1988 the measures were somewhat different.  There were no wage hikes, and 
the policy was to give first an exceptional nominal bonus of 3,000 intis to both 
the private and public sectors and one of 9,000 intis, fifteen days later, to the 
public sector alone. In the case of the unionized workers of the private sector 
the 9,000 intis increase that was also granted to them would be an advance 
payment, anticipating the next general increment or individual pact. The same 
type of wage containment measures were to be found in the November mea- 
sures. 
All these  measures  and  several other details  suggest that the  purpose of 
wage policies was to reduce aggregate demand and to alter income distribu- 
tion between capital and wage labor as well as among laborers. The ex ante 
containment of wages was absolutely transparent and coherent with the struc- 
ture of the successive adjustment “packages” that were implemented. 
Several other aspects of the paper are worth commenting upon, but I will 
concentrate on some general views that require greater insight or at least some 
polishing.  The first one refers  to the interventionist nature of  the  Peruvian 
government.  I feel that Lago applies to Garcia some much-repeated features 
that are part of an abstract model of intervention that can be characterized by 
the use of multiple exchange rates, import restrictions, and expansionary pol- 
icies and which appear in most critical evaluations by multilateral organiza- 
tions.  How important  these specific features were in generating the crisis is 
open to question, as is the relative importance of these types of interventions 
within  the whole  set  of  Garcia’s  manipulations.  The lesson,  in  any  case, 
would seem to be that if  you unify exchange rates, eliminate import restric- 
tions, and avoid growth, you are on the right track. Is it so simple? Are those 
necessary conditions to stabilize the economy? I do not think so, nor, much 
less, that they are sufficient. We know those policies become critically impor- 
tant and particularly dangerous in those cases in which you lack a long-term 
development  program, state administrative  capabilities,  and a solid  institu- 
tional base, all of which were the deeper weaknesses of Garcia’s government. 
In fact, in Colombia or Korea, for instance, those interventions have not been 
so dangerous. 
Another aspect of the paper that would require a more sophisticated analy- 
sis is related to the government’s objective with respect to the State. Lago says 
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First, Garcia has never been characterized by his prostatist ideology. He made 
explicit from the beginning  that he was against planning  and state control. 
What he wanted  and practiced  was the expansion of  his own personal  role. 
Second, Alan Garcia ravaged the state to its roots. His most systematic behav- 
ior was to bleed public enterprises to death, decapitalizing them “at the service 
of  particular  interest groups.”  The attempted nationalization of  the financial 
system had little to do with his vision  about the state and, even less, as the 
official version  states, with  the resistance  to invest  on the part  of  the  “12 
apostles”; much more important was his political conflict within the party and 
his need to recover its leadership. This critical aspect of the problem explains 
the chaotic  implementation  of the measure,  its extremely  short preparation 
period,  and the small size of the team that designed the nationalization at- 
tempt. Garcia did not strengthen the National Planning Institute, did not es- 
tablish  any  institution  with  enough power to  coordinate  state activities; he 
sucked resources from every comer of the state in order to empower himself 
and announced that the Social Security System would be privatized. His more 
common statements about the state stressed its mild regulatory function and 
always rejected its role as planner. 
A final questionable aspect of Lago’s view is the one related to the auton- 
omy of the Central Bank with respect to the president. The argument goes as 
if  the monetary  approach to the balance of payments was the enemy of  the 
Belaunde government first and of the Garcia presidency afterward. 
Again,  evidence  shows that the problem was more complex than  “Webb 
against Belaunde’s  populist policies.”  In fact, the president himself  was not 
totally  innocent in relation to the poor electoral results of  his own party be- 
cause, as with Garcia before the attempted nationalization,  he had  lost the 
control of his party and the new candidate of his party had to be destroyed, 
as, in fact, happened. A strict monetary policy was useful to him. This does 
not imply absence of conflicts between the Central Bank and the president, 
but it is not easy to reduce the conflict to the populist-versus-monetarist para- 
digm. 
With respect to the Coronado versus Garcia chapter, things are even more 
complex. During the first four months of 1989, Rivas Davila, the secretary of 
economy and finance (MEF), did not demand a cent from the Central Bank. 
Monetary restriction was not strictly speaking a Coronado affair, since others 
in pvernment backed that policy. One component of this policy was, by the 
way,  the reduction in subsidies from $70 (in U.S. dollars) per month in No- 
vember  1988 to $4 in April  1989. In December  1988 and January  1989, im- 
pact of several key products such as canned milk and com were moved to the 
free exchange rate market. Summarizing, Coronado’s policy was mainly part 
of government’s policy. His conflicts with the executive were real, but not as 
significant as Lago considers. 
The important question, however, is about populism. My impression is that 
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new to the traditional policy recommendations of  the Bretton Woods institu- 
tions.  I  feel  that  the  definition  of  several  Latin  American  governments  as 
“populist” helps to show that some basic macroeconomic rules should never 
be forgotten. This is, I think, the best application of that concept, but I do not 
believe we should go much further with it. To use that sensible recommenda- 
tion in order to push for just one way of abiding by those rules is not helpful 
because the concrete economic and political methods and institutions cannot 
be derived from them. Perhaps that is why the problem is so stubborn. 
Comment  Miguel A. Savastano 
Ricardo Lago has presented a very illustrative and well-documented descrip- 
tion  of  Peru’s heterodox  experiment  of  the  past  five years.  He shows in  a 
detailed way how the recent Peruvian experience fits most of the elements of 
the populist paradigm described by Dornbusch and Edwards,’ from the initial 
conditions to the different phases of the experiment, with the probable excep- 
tion of the apocalyptic final phase predicted for Peru in that article. Although 
I  find it hard  to disagree  with most of  what  Lago has  said about the  main 
features and flaws of this experience, I think that he has overlooked-or  at 
least not emphasized sufficiently-some  elements that turn out to be crucial 
for understanding the emergence and the chaotic results of President Garcia’s 
administration. 
In the first place, regarding the initial conditions found by the APRA gov- 
ernment, it is necessary to have clear the fact th& populist regimes of different 
vintages have been the norm rather than the exception in Peru during the last 
30 years. The degree of government intervention in almost all the spheres of 
economic  activity  has  increased  steadily  since  the  first  Belaunde  govern- 
ment-as  reflected by the share of  total public-sector expenditures on GDP 
that rose from 26% in 1968 to 58% in 1985-and  the revealed preference for 
discretionary and short-lasting measures has been the commonplace of almost 
all finance ministers and Central Bank governors during this period. Even the 
second  Belaunde  administration  (from  1980-85)  carried  out mild  populist 
policies, in spite of its initial rhetoric and its quickly aborted trade liberaliza- 
tion program.  Public investment reached its highest level in Peruvian history 
in 1982 (10.5% of GDP), no privatization of  the more than 200 public enter- 
prises was even attempted-except  for newspapers and TV stations-and  the 
fiscal deficit  averaged 7.5% of GDP during this period.  The reader of this 
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paper, then, should not be surprised to find out that the “only” reformist step 
taken by President Garcia was the failed nationalization of the banking sys- 
tem. There was not (or is not, for that matter) much else to nationalize in Peru 
without the risk of  transforming the country into an outright socialist econ- 
omy. 
On the other hand, I think that one has to be more careful before character- 
izing the stabilization attempts undertaken from 1980 to 1985 as “orthodox” 
or “serious.” The continuous adjustment of the exchange rate and of public- 
sector prices during the last two years of Belaunde’s government represented 
isolated measures that reflected a concern for the deteriorating external posi- 
tion of  the country in the midst of  the debt crisis, but they were  far from 
constituting a consistent strategy to stabilize the economy. In fact, it would 
not be difficult to show that the “overwhelming evidence of failure of orthodox 
policies” cited so effusively by the proponents of the heterodox plan and by 
many  other  economic  advisors,  including  former  Central  Bank  President 
Richard Webb,2 was more the natural consequence of  a badly implemented 
partial stabilization program than the reflection of  the negative effects of  an 
“overdone” stabilization as Lago seems to suggest. 
Moving now to the initial phase of the APRA experiment, I think that- 
besides the price-cost freeze and the depressed domestic market-an  impor- 
tant and downplayed factor that facilitated the disinflation achieved in the first 
two years was the forced conversion of  dollar deposits that was decreed in 
August  1985.  The  “dollarization”  of  the  domestic  financial  system  had 
reached very significant levels during the Belaunde administration (more than 
70% of the private sector’s financial assets were held in foreign currency by 
1985), and the confiscation of these deposits represented for the government 
a sudden increase in the base of the inflation tax and the ready availability of 
approximately $1 billion. Indeed, the figures reported in table 9.5 of the paper 
show that the income velocity of money experienced almost a 40% decrease 
from June  1985 to June  1986. It is this forced increase in the demand for 
domestic money,  and  not  the suggested independent stance of  the  Central 
Bank, that explains the lack of  an aggressive expansion of  monetary aggre- 
gates in the first phase of the experiment. 
Another potential source of confusion that I have found in Lago’s paper- 
as well as in the few other accounts of this experience-is  the tendency to 
identify the turning point of the experiment with the government’s attempt to 
nationalize the private banking system in July 1987. In spite of the great polit- 
ical, and not economic, significance of this move, one has to be emphatic in 
asserting that the anachronic and pernicious inward-oriented strategy adopted 
was deemed to fail even in the absence of this nationalization attempt. Perhaps 
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the eruption of the crisis would not have been as abrupt as it was, but the huge 
fiscal and current account deficits and the steady appreciation of the real ex- 
change rate could not have been sustained much longer without some serious 
adjustment. 
Finally, I think that a very interesting feature of the Peruvian experiment is 
that it ran out of steam without taking the economy to an open hyperinflation. 
Lago assigns the responsibility of this result to the independent stance adopted 
by  the Central Bank’s Governor Pedro Coronado from September 1988 to 
June 1989. Even if one is willing to be as generous as the author in describing 
Coronado’s performance-leaving  aside the fact that he maintained most of 
the pervasive foreign exchange controls as well as the credit and interest rates 
regulations-it  seems to me that his partial and insufficient measures only 
contributed to jeopardize the success of the comprehensive stabilization pro- 
gram that is urgently required in Peru. 
Undoubtedly the credit crunch of  early 1989, together with the imperfect 
indexation of wages and the systematic delay in adjusting controlled prices, 
prevented the explosion of  a hyperinflationary spiral at the cost of  an enor- 
mous recession. However, it is also true that by  mid-1989 inflation remained 
high and the private sector became an active supporter of the executive’s de- 
mands for a looser credit policy. In  this context, the fact that the so-called 
maquinazo of July 1989 (21% of the monetary base) did not have any notice- 
able effect on the inflation rate of the following six months ended up vindicat- 
ing the president’s position regarding the irrelevance of  “monetarist” or “or- 
thodox” predicaments. Moreover, the “bad’ steady-state equilibrium in which 
the Peruvian economy appears to be currently trapped (which is documented 
in tables 9.6 and 9.7) has affected the general consensus regarding the need to 
stabilize the economy and is reviving the very same arguments of  “lack of 
excess aggregate demand’ that were used in late 1985 to justify the heterodox 
program. 
To  me this is just  another illustration of  the fact that the partial and ill- 
conceived stabilization attempts that are so common in recent Peruvian his- 
tory do more harm than good by damaging the effectiveness of crucial policy 
instruments and by adding more noise to the perverse dynamics of high infla- 
tions. It also shows that the design of a coherent set of  instruments capable of, 
among other things, enforcing the legally contemplated independence of the 
Central Bank is even more important than the laws themselves for avoiding 
what I see as the inevitable repetition of another populist blast. Sadly enough, 
however, even today  I  am  not  sure that  Peruvians have learned this  basic 
lesson. 